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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Introduction 
The present study looked at the feasibility of delivering insurance products through 
the UK Community Development Financial Institution (CDFI) sector. Its UK-wide 
presence and experience of working with financially excluded consumers would 
suggest that the sector could potentially be an effective conduit of insurance. The 
focus of the study was mainly on Home Contents Insurance (HCI) and on life 
insurance. This was because low-income households are at greater risk of and are 
vulnerable to death of a household member and loss of home contents, given that they 
live in high-risk areas and often rely on a single income. 
In order to ascertain the feasibility of a CDFI insurance delivery model, we conducted 
focus groups with actual and potential target CDFI clients to understand the extent 
and nature of demand for insurance products. We reviewed the experiences of eight 
international and UK insurance schemes aimed at the financially excluded to 
understand key challenges and potential mechanisms related to the delivery of 
insurance to low-income, financially excluded households. Finally, in order to 
understand the legal opportunities and barriers for the provision of insurance through 
CDFIs, we examined the regulatory framework for insurance provision. 
Vulnerability and access to insurance in the UK 
Low-income households in the UK are especially vulnerable to income shocks, as 
they are at greater risk of crime, illness and premature death. They are also often in a 
weak position to sustain and increase their income through the labour market. In 
addition, there are growing economic, fiscal and political pressures for households 
and individuals to finance life-stage and life-cycle costs. 
Yet, despite their vulnerability, low-income households and tenants are much less 
likely to be insured compared to the overall population and particularly compared to 
the middle to higher-income groups. Data from the 2005/2006 Family and Resources 
Survey show that the ownership falls in tandem with income, and that 91.5% and 
39.7% of home owners had home contents and life insurance respectively compared 
with 35.9 and 19.5 for tenants. 
These households are less likely to have HCI due to their tenancy status, low income 
and exclusion from mainstream financial services. Also, research suggests that as 
financially excluded or marginalised consumers living on a low income, they are 
likely to demand policies serviced by cash, with no excess and small minimum sums 
insured, which are not widely available in the mainstream market. 
UK national government policy in this area has mainly centred on increasing the 
outreach and uptake of social housing tenant insurance schemes. Part of the remit of 
the Financial Inclusion Champions – a programme run by the DWP to build and 
coordinate partnerships to promote financial inclusion – is to work with housing 
associations and social landlords in particular geographical areas to increase the 
supply and take-up of appropriate home contents insurance schemes. 
Demand for insurance policies 
Only eight out of the 31 focus group participants had HCI. The insured were, with one 
exception, home owners and they were generally older households without children. 
The reasons for not having HCI were that insurance was too costly, that the 
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participants had not got around to it, that the participants did not trust the insurer and 
that they did not like the principles of insurance. 
As an ideal protection product, the participants wanted a simple and comprehensive 
policy covering all eventualities, including breakdown cover for household appliances. 
In addition, they wanted the product to be affordable and many wanted to at least have 
the option of paying in cash. Face-to-face sales were preferred, whereby the products 
and the fine print would be well explained. The focus groups participants also felt it 
was essential to be able to trust that the insurer would pay out in the event of a claim 
and that the claims process would respectful and would not criminalise the claimants. 
Providing insurance to the financially excluded: the UK experience 
Unfortunately, the lack of data makes it difficult to ascertain whether the existing 
schemes are making inroads in lowering the proportion of uninsured households. The 
estimates would indicate an average take-up of 10% for the Social Housing Landlord 
tenant insurance schemes. The ABI (2007) reports that despite the fall in costs in real 
terms of around 40% from 1994 to 2007, the proportion of the population with home 
contents and building insurance has remained relatively stable. This seems to be 
confirmed by data cited by Demos and Safe (2005). 
We interviewed representatives from UK insurance schemes aimed at the financially 
excluded. The interviewees highlighted four issues that CDFIs must grapple with to 
make a dent in the number of uninsured households: 
- Deep-rooted distrust among low-income households of insurers. 
- Many low-income households believe that they do not have enough assets to 
warrant taking out an HCI policy. 
- Many tenants mistakenly believe that they and the contents of their 
accommodation are protected against a range of incidents, such as leaking pipes. 
- Many elderly tenants, who have a greater propensity to take out insurance, have 
already taken out an HCI policy with Age Concern. 
Not all of the abovementioned factors were raised in the focus groups with CDFI 
target clients. For example, none of the focus group participants mentioned not having 
sufficient assets as a reason for not having insurance. 
Providing insurance to the financially excluded: the experience of international 
MFIs 
Drawing on the experience of the international microfinance sector in providing 
insurance for the financially excluded is an important component of the research. 
Because many MFIs have already incorporated insurance provision alongside 
microcredit and savings products, their experience may provide valuable insight into 
the potential institutional impact (human resources, structures and processes) of 
insurance provision for CDFIs. 
The experiences of the international case study MFIs suggest that motivating staff and 
fitting the marketing and selling of insurance alongside their existing tasks constitutes 
a key challenge. Based on the practices applied by the case study MFIs, potential 
solutions to this include offering bonuses and putting in place a simple and quick 
method for explaining and selling insurance. 
However, not all the lessons from that could be immediately applied in the case of the 
UK CDFI sector. Although compulsory policies avoid adverse selection, increase up-
take and reduce administrative costs, CDFIs are unlikely to offer such products 
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because it would contradict the goal of empowering their clients to access financial 
products corresponding to their particular needs. 
That said a potentially very interesting lesson for the UK sector is the finding 
concerning a centralised back-office system. One of the international case study MFIs 
had a centralised back-office system which also enabled the reduction of cost per 
policy issued by the local microinsurance provider. A possibility for the UK CDFIs 
could potentially be to create a joint back-office system to reduce costs. 
Regulatory framework – barriers and opportunities 
There is no straightforward answer to the question on the regulatory implications for 
CDFIs if they were to get involved in insurance mediation1. First, it is possible that 
CDFIs may be exempt from regulation. The exclusions from regulation are largely 
contained in the “by way of business” test which tries to distinguish insurance 
intermediation carried out for business purposes for commercial gain from 
intermediation that is really a by-product of some other activity. In this case, the 
CDFIs would only need to report that they are within the parameters for exemption. 
Second, if the CDFIs were to be regulated, the numerous overlapping regulatory 
concerns and the move towards outcome-based regulation, makes it difficult to 
ascertain the exact implications of being regulated. 
However, it would involve regular reporting to the FSA concerning financial status 
(e.g. balance sheet, profit and loss account, professional indemnity insurance etc), 
human resources (training and competence) and management systems (conduct of 
business, processes to deal with conflicts of interest). Although the CDFIs currently 
have some limited reporting in relation to DWP funding and have to comply with 
some relevant regulation under the Consumer Credit Act, becoming regulated under 
the FSA would most likely lead to a substantial increase in the regulatory burden and 
therefore an additional cost for CDFIs to meet. 
Next steps – towards a model of CDFI insurance provision 
On the basis of the government emphasis on increasing the proportion of households 
with HCI and of the latent demand for HCI detected in this study, it might seem 
natural to recommend that CDFIs start offering HCI. Nevertheless, for three reasons 
we recommend that the CDFIs do not offer HCI, at least for the time being: 
- In light of the deep-rooted and very negative attitudes of the focus group 
participants towards HCI and HCI providers, we fear that offering HCI could 
potentially have a negative impact on the reputation of the CDFIs. 
- Because scale appears to be a major driver of affordability nationally and 
internationally, there are serious doubts as to whether CDFIs would be able to 
achieve affordable policies for its clients, given the limited number of clients. 
- Although take-up can be improved, existing schemes have the potential 
effectively meeting the demand of uninsured households. For example, the focus 
groups and the interviews with insurance providers suggest that premium-payment 
with rent is likely to raise up-take of existing social housing insurance schemes.   
Instead, we recommend that the CDFIs examine the potential of offering a voluntary, 
combined life and credit life insurance policy. Historically, if delivered in the right 
way, life insurance policies have proven popular. Claims processing is in most cases 
more straightforward and less controversial. 
                                                 
1 A definition of ‘insurance mediation’ is given in section 7.1 of this report. 
Glossary 
ABI  Association of British Insurers 
ADIE Association pour le droit a l’initiative économique – French 
microfinance institution 
CAP  Christians Against Poverty 
CDFI Community Development Financial Institution – independent 
organisation lending and investing in deprived areas and underserved 
markets without access to mainstream finance 
CETZAM Christian Enterprise Trust Zambia – Zambian microfinance institution 
DWP  Department for Work and Pensions 
FSA  Financial Services Authority 
FSMA  Financial Services and Market Act 2000 
HCI  Home Contents Insurance 
IWG  Insurance Working Group 
MFI  Microfinance Institution 
NHF  National Housing Federation 
NIC  National Insurance Contribution 
OFL  Options for Life 
OI  Opportunity International 
RAMR  Retail Mediation Activities Return 
WWF  World’s Women Foundation – Colombian microfinance institution 
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1. Introduction 
This technical report presents the findings of a study into potential models for 
delivering affordable insurance through Community Development Finance 
Institutions (CDFIs). The UK CDFI sector already offers savings and affordable credit 
enabling low-income households to accumulate consumer durables and furniture, and 
to cope with small and predictable external shocks. Therefore it does not seem 
unreasonable that the sector should also enable its clients to manage and cope with 
unpredictable shocks with great financial implications by offering insurance products. 
Yet to date, there has been limited focus on providing affordable insurance products 
to excluded households using CDFIs, let alone a feasibility study. This is somewhat 
surprising, considering that the Association of British Insurers (ABI) has cited the 
lack of trusted distribution networks to get the product to the market as one of the 
obstacles for insurance provision to low-income households. 2  There are several 
reasons for why CDFIs could potentially be a trusted distribution network linking 
low-income segments of the market and insurers. 
First, the sector is already marketing and delivering specialised financial products to 
low-income segments of the market. Hence the CDFIs have already grappled with 
many of the problems they are likely to encounter in delivering insurance to this 
segment of the market, such as information asymmetries, adverse selection and high 
transaction costs (Siegel et al, 2001). Moreover, research suggests that cross-selling 
insurance alongside other financial products is an important determinant of the 
possession of HCI (Whyley et al, 1998). 
Second, the sector has an established circle of clients, to whom they could market 
these products. Currently the CDFIs have a presence in most of the UK with a 
growing outreach through offices and also by operating through the offices of social 
landlords.  
Finally, in the case of the UK, a potentially added advantage of working through the 
CDFI sector is that it tends to insist on customers servicing loans through bank 
accounts and in some cases it offers support for customers to open and manage such 
accounts. This is important given that the reliance on direct debits and automated 
transfers is an important barrier for accessing and servicing insurance among 
financially excluded households.  
Among the potential benefits for the CDFIs is that insurance may reduce the impact of 
external shocks on the ability of the clients to service loans and that it may constitute 
an additional source of income (Siegel et al, 2001). 
However, the feasibility of delivering affordable insurance products through this 
sector ultimately depends on three factors: 
- Is there a sufficient demand justify a CDFI insurance scheme? 
- Are existing insurance schemes targeting the financially excluded sufficient to 
meet this demand? 
- Do viable models for the delivery of insurance products to excluded households 
through UK CDFIs exist? 
It is important to note that we in this study mainly focus on Home Contents Insurance 
(HCI) and on life insurance. As we discuss in Chapter  2, low-income households are 
                                                 
2 Meeting note of Financial Inclusion Taskforce meeting – 12 April 2007 
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at greater risk of and are vulnerable to death of a household member and loss of home 
contents, given that they live in high-risk areas and often rely on a single income. 
In order to answer the questions set out above, we conducted focus groups with actual 
and potential target CDFI clients to understand the extent and nature of demand for 
insurance products. We also reviewed the experiences of eight international and UK 
insurance schemes aimed at the financially excluded to understand key challenges and 
potential mechanisms related to the delivery of insurance to low-income, financially 
excluded households. Finally, in order to understand the legal opportunities and 
barriers for the provision of insurance through CDFIs, we examined the regulatory 
framework for insurance provision. 
We find that there appears to be a latent demand for HCI and life policies, and 
historical data on the proportion of uninsured household would suggest that existing 
schemes do not meet the demand for HCI. However, in light of deep-rooted negative 
attitudes towards HCI and its providers, we recommend that the CDFIs do not start 
offering HCI because of the reputational risk for the CDFI sector. Instead, we 
recommend that the CDFIs examine the potential of offering a voluntary, combined 
life and credit life insurance policy. Historically, if delivered in the right way, life 
insurance policies have proven popular. Claims processing is in most cases more 
straightforward and less controversial. 
The remainder of this report is divided into seven chapters: 
- Chapter 2: Insurance for low-income households: demand, access and barriers 
- Chapter 3: Methodology and research design 
- Chapter 4: Demand for insurance products among CDFI target clients 
- Chapter 5: Providing insurance to low-income households: the UK experience 
- Chapter 6: Providing insurance to low-income households: the experience of 
international microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
- Chapter 7: Regulatory review: Barriers and opportunities 
- Chapter 8: Conclusions: Towards a CDFI model for insurance delivery 
Additional documentation can be found in appendices: 
- Appendix A: UK Insurance Scheme Interview Guide 
- Appendix B: International Microinsurance Interview Guide 
- Appendix C: Focus group topic guide 
- Appendix D: Introduction to Guided Sales 
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2. Literature review: Access and barriers to access to insurance for 
low-income households in the UK 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter reviews a range of relevant academic papers, reports and statistical 
sources relating to insurance in order to provide an overview of the vulnerability of 
low-income, financially excluded households and the potential need for insurance 
products; the access to and barriers to access to insurance among deprived households 
and; UK and international insurance schemes targeting the financially excluded. 
2.2. Vulnerability of low-income households  
Low-income households in the UK often live a precarious existence. They are 
generally at greater risk of income shocks, as they have more unstable income stream 
owing to tenuous links to the labour market. According to Howarth and Kenway 
(2004, p.29), “40% of people making a new claim for job seekers’ allowance were 
last claiming the same benefit less than six months previously”, suggesting that many 
households on benefits move in and out of employment. Furthermore, there has been 
a general rise in temporary employment. For example, the 1990s saw a doubling of 
the number of men in non-permanent positions (Cam et al, 2003 cf. Burton et al, 
2004). 
Furthermore, for numerous reasons low-income households often find it difficult to 
meet immediate or short-term (e.g. legal fees, funeral and associated expenses), 
recurring costs (e.g. bills, rent, household consumption) and long-term effects (e.g. 
loss of income source) associated with income shocks (e.g. death in household, loss of 
job) and expenditure hikes. 
First, low-income households are concentrated in low-wage, low-skill sectors or on a 
fixed wage. This income may in many cases be just enough to cover the very basics of 
consumption leaving little or no room to cut or to smoothen consumption in the face 
of external shocks or drops in income. In addition, many low-income households rely 
on single income. Smith and Middleton (2007) find that single-income households are 
less likely to escape poverty. Out of the households that entered poverty, 50% of the 
single-income households with a child of less than six years of age escaped after a 
year, compared to over 90% of dual-income households without children (Smith and 
Middleton, 2007, p.81). 
Second, as they are on a low disposable income and often lack the safe means of 
saving (e.g. savings accounts), low-income households are often not able to build up a 
considerable buffer in the form of savings which they can draw on in the case of an 
emergency. Indeed, a recent study showed that 43% of households had no savings 
whatsoever (Treasury Select Committee, 2006 cf. New Policy Institute, 2007). This is 
particularly the case for low-income households. According to the Financial 
Resources Survey of 2004-2005, 60% of households with incomes in the poorest fifth 
found themselves unable to save as little as £10 on a monthly basis (New Policy 
Institute, 2007). 
Third, a combination of low educational attainment and skill levels often leave these 
households with a limited range of opportunities to supplement household income in 
the labour market. This is reinforced by the fact that people in low-skill jobs are less 
likely receive job-related training compared with people in higher-skill professions 
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(Howarth and Kenway, 2004). Particularly for low-income households with children – 
one third of low-income households have children (Palmer et al, 2006) – it may be 
difficult to find a job with a sufficiently high salary to cover child costs, transport and 
other costs (Howarth and Kenway, 2004). 
These drivers of vulnerability are further accentuated by broader economic, fiscal and 
political pressures for households and individuals to make provisions for old age and 
to generally finance life-stage and life-cycle costs. Increasingly, social funding has 
become means-tested. There has also been a move away from grants towards loans in 
aiding low-income households make lump-sum payments to replace white goods and 
other consumer durables. The different benefits available to households experiencing 
external shocks are detailed in Box 2.1. 
 Box 2.1: Public safety-nets 
There are a wide range of benefits households can recur to in the event of external shocks. 
Here we look at benefits in the form of interest-free loans and grants available to households 
in the event of external shocks otherwise covered by HCI or life insurance. In the event of 
burglaries, flooding and other external shocks low-income households in the UK, can access 
grants and loans through the social fund. The access to these funds is restricted by local 
availability so even if the applicant meets the criteria the application may be turned down. 
- Community Grants: Grants available for furniture and household goods for recipients of 
means-tested benefits. Applications are only granted if seen as essential for remaining or 
integrating into community. In 2007-2008, 247,000 grants were made of an average value 
of £458 (DWP, 2008). The majority of recipients are lone parent and disabled households. 
- Budgeting loans: Interest-free loans to cover one-off expenses, including household 
goods, granted to recipients of means-tested benefits. These loans are dependent on the 
local availability of funding. In 2007-2008, just below 1.2 million loans of an average 
value of £433 were awarded (DWP, 2008).  
- Crisis loans: Non-means tested interest-free loan awarded to households experiencing an 
emergencies where payment of a crisis loan is the only means of avoiding a risk to health 
and safety. Payments can be issued immediately to living expenses or essential items. In 
2007-2008, 1.4 million crisis loans of an average value of £82 were awarded (DWP, 
2008). 
Specifically in the event of the death of a household member, UK low-income households can 
potentially rely on the following public support mechanisms. It is worth noting that access to 
bereavement allowances is restricted by the insistence on National Insurance Contributions 
(NICs).  
- Funeral grants: Grant covering burial plot, cemetery fees, travel costs and other funeral 
expenses granted to recipients of means-tested benefits and paid back from any estate of 
deceased. This grant is funded through the social fund and this depends on availability. 
- Bereavement payment: Spouses and partners of deceased can claim £2,000 lump sum 
payment provided the deceased had paid their NICs or their death was caused by their job 
and either: the claimant is under State Pension age3 when person died; or deceased was 
not entitled to Category A state Retirement Benefit4 when they died. 
- Bereavement allowance: Spouses and partners of deceased of 45 years of age and older 
can claim a maximum weekly allowance of £27.21-90.70 depending on deceased’ NICs. 
This allowance can only be claimed by spouses or partners without children, under State 
Pension age and provided the deceased had paid their NICs or their death was caused by 
their job. This allowance can be claimed if and until the widow or widower remarries or 
moves in with new partner. 
                                                 
3 The State Pension age is 60 for women and 65 for men 
4 Category A State retirement Benefit is based on a person’s own NICs. 
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- Widowed Parent’s Allowance: Spouses and partners of deceased who are also parents 
may be able to claim a maximum of £90.70 per week provided the claimant is bringing up 
a child or young person under 19, the claimant is pregnant with the baby of the deceased, 
the claimant is under State Pension age and deceased paid NICs or died as a result of their 
job 
- Guardian Allowance: This allowance is for people bringing up children whose parents 
have died. Claimant has to qualify for Child Benefit for child or children the person is 
bringing up and one of the parents who died was either born in the UK, was from EEA or 
Switzerland or had been in the UK for at least 52 weeks during any 2-year period since 
they were 16 years old. 
In addition, in the event of death in the household the remaining household members may 
claim community grants and crisis loans provided they meet the relevant eligibility criteria. 
The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) is currently considering replacing the 
interest-free crisis and budgeting loans granted under the Social Fund with interest-
carrying loans issued by Third sector lenders (DWP, 2008). The emphasis on 
households being able to deal with life-stage and life-cycle costs is also reflected in 
the financial inclusion agenda. Much government effort has been directed at 
increasing the propensity to save among low-income households through the Savings 
Gateway and the Child Trust Fund. This means that households, including those at a 
low income, must increasingly ensure that they themselves are in a position to tackle 
income shocks and expenditure hikes. 
2.3. Insurance as a coping strategy 
Given these circumstances, insurance policies can under certain conditions be an 
effective strategy for low-income households to cope with external shocks. “Insurance 
reimburses an individual for some or all of a financial loss that is linked to an 
unpredictable event or risk” (Churchill et al, 2003, p.9).  
This means that, providing the chance of the event occurring is relatively small, an 
insurance policy is likely to offer greater compensation than if the households were to 
put equivalent amounts into their savings accounts (Brown and Churchill, 1999). This 
is because the households with an insurance policy pool their resources to provide 
compensation for the policy holders who are negatively affected by the event in 
question, allowing the insurer to spread the risk over a pool of households and 
compensate the claimant in full (Brown and Churchill, 1999). Typically insurable 
events include fire, burglary or death of main bread-earner: they are unpredictable, but 
result in considerable losses. 
It is important to stress that insurance policies are only effective means of coping with 
shocks that have a relatively high uncertainty and that cause large losses. Events that 
are more certain to happen and that have smaller loss implications may be more 
effectively dealt with by loans, savings or investment products. Life-cycle (weddings, 
funerals, baptisms) and life-stage events (retirement, setting up a home) are good 
examples of shocks for which households can be prepare through pension plans, loans 
and savings. 
2.4. Access to insurance 
Yet, despite its potential importance for vulnerable households, research suggests that 
many households, particularly those on a low income, do not have any form of 
insurance policy (e.g. Demos and Safe, 2005; ABI 2007). In this section, we use data 
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from the most recent Expenditure and Food Survey (2005-2006) to look at the 
proportion of the population with life and HCI. 
Extending the access to HCI is seen as a key priority for the government (HM 
Treasury, 2007), whilst life insurance is a potentially important product for vulnerable 
groups given the high prevalence of single-income households among the poor. 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 display the proportions of UK households with home contents and 
life insurance by tenancy and income level respectively. 
Table 2.1: Proportion of households with insurance by income level 
 UK average Lowest 
income 
decile 
Second 
income 
decile 
Below 
median 
income 
Above 
median 
income 
HCI 75.2 43.7 58.1 63.6 86.8 
Life insurance 
 
33.8 14.9 19.9 24.3 43.4 
Notes: Shown as percentage of all households with home contents and life insurance 
Source: Expenditure and Food Survey 2005-2006 
The data reported in Table 2.1 are largely in line with expectations and are similar to 
the findings of other studies. The proportion of households with HCI rises with 
income. For HCI, there seems to be a particularly large leap from the lowest to the 
second income decile. Only 4 in every 10 households of the lowest income decile 
have home content insurance compared to nearly 6 in every 10 for the second lowest.  
These findings are largely corroborated by a recent survey conducted by the ABI 
(2007). The survey focused on households with very low income (<£10,000), low 
income (£10,000-15,000) and average incomes (£15,000-£30,000), and found that 
35% and 20% of the very low and low-income households, respectively, had no form 
of insurance products (ABI, 2007). Disaggregated by product, the figures were even 
starker: among the lowest-income bracket 60% did not have a home content insurance 
and more than 75% did not have a life insurance (ABI, 2007). For low-income 
households, the figures were 40% and 60% respectively (ABI, 2007). 
As we discuss in greater detail below, there are numerous reasons for why low-
income households often are without insurance products, including that mainstream 
products may be unaffordable and not adjusted to their needs, and that low financial 
literacy prevents low-income households from realising the potential benefits of 
insurance products. 
Table 2.2: Proportion of households with insurance by tenancy 
 UK average Owner-
occupied 
Tenants Private 
tenants 
SHL* 
tenants 
HCI 75.2 91.5 35.8 36.5 36.3 
Life insurance 
 
33.8 39.7 19.5 17.2 21.2 
Notes: Shown as percentage of all households with home contents and life insurance 
* Social Housing Landlord 
Source: Expenditure and Food Survey 2005-2006 
Table 2.2 shows that both life and HCI are considerably more common among 
households in owner-occupied accommodation than social and private tenants. In 
particular, tenancy seems to exert a greater influence on the possession of HCI than 
income. Almost all households in owner-occupied accommodation possess HCI, 
whilst just over 35% of social and private tenants have HCI. These figures are similar 
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if slightly lower than those generated by the survey conducted by the ABI (2007). 
They found that around 40% of social and private tenants had home content insurance, 
whilst 24% had a life insurance policy. 
The data in Table 2.2 suggests that the pattern concerning life insurance is similar 
with households in owner-occupied accommodation are more than twice as likely to 
have a life insurance policy compared to tenants. 
In their study Demos and Safe (2004) argue that there has been a divergent trend in 
the possession of HCI over the past decade. Whilst overall the proportion of the 
population with home content insurance has risen, the proportion of households in 
council estates with such insurance has fallen (Demos and Safe, 2005). In 2004, there 
was an estimated 3 million households living on council estates lacking HCI (Demos 
and Safe, 2005). Demos and Safe (2005) also reported a rise in the proportion of 
households without HCI. 
The great difference in possession of HCI between home owners and renters is not 
surprising. The lower propensity of renters for possessing home content insurance can 
be explained by the fact that they move more frequently, have less control over 
property security and other risk factors affecting premiums (HM Treasury, 2007). In 
addition, HCI is sold and marketed alongside other financial products, particularly 
structural or buildings insurance. Given that home-buyers are required to purchase 
such insurance, they are likely to purchase home content insurance at the same time. 
For tenants, who do not take out building insurance, this opportunity simply does not 
arise (Whyley et al, 1998). 
Historical data suggests that the ownership of HCI has remained fairly stable over the 
last 15 years. The ABI (2007) reports that despite the fall in costs in real terms of 
around 40% from 1994 to 2007, the proportion of the population with home contents 
and building insurance has remained relatively stable. This seems to be confirmed by 
data cited by Demos and Safe (2005). Between 1994/1995 and 2003/2004 the 
proportion of registered social landlord tenants fell from 63.4% to 59.2%, but the 
proportion of council tenants without insurance increased from 54.4% to 60.8%. The 
data from the most recent FRS suggests that the proportion of social tenants without 
insurance has remained stable at around 64%. 
In sum, as highlighted in this section, the access to home content insurance is 
significantly lower among low-income households and tenants compared with the 
overall population and particularly compared with the middle to higher-income 
groups.  
2.5. Barriers to access 
There is a wide range of factors accounting for the low ownership of life and HCI 
policies among households living on low incomes and in rented accommodation. On 
the demand side, there are three main factors reducing the propensity of households to 
take out insurance policies. 
First, like other financial products, insurance policies are often not appropriately 
designed to accommodate the needs and preference of low-income consumers. 
Premiums may be too high for households who find themselves unable to save as little 
as £2.50 on a weekly basis. There is often no allowance for lapses increasing the risk 
of discontinuation of policies given the low and fluctuating incomes of low-income 
consumers.  
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Second, the channels through which insurance is sold and distributed are likely to 
discourage low-income consumers from purchasing insurance policies. Insurance is 
often sold online or telephonically and serviced using direct debits. Yet, research 
indicates that these households often prefer a more personalised, face-to-face delivery 
and servicing of financial products (Collard et al, 2001; IPSOS Mori, 2007). 
Finally, a low degree of financial literacy and understanding of insurance products 
may make low-income households less likely to solicit such products (Collard et al, 
2001). In particular, the Insurance Working Group (IWG), established by the 
Financial Inclusion Taskforce, highlights the lack of understanding of the benefits of 
insurance and mistrust of insurance companies as important demand-side barriers to 
accessing insurance for low-income households (IWG cf. HM Treasury, 2007).  
In light of these demand issues, Burton et al (2007) argue that the demise of industrial 
branch, or home service, insurance sold and serviced through an insurance sales agent 
network has been detrimental for the access to life insurance policies for low-income, 
working class households. The penalties imposed for missing direct debits combined 
with the high minimum premium payments make seeking insurance with traditional 
insurers undesirable (Alteroff et al, 2004). Conversely, the low minimum premiums, 
door collection service and flexibility of payment terms made industrial branch 
insurance an enticing product for low-income households (Burton et al, 2007). 
However, over the past two decades three factors conspired leading to the demise of 
industrial branch insurance (Alteroff et al, 2004; Burton et al, 2005; Leyshon et al, 
2004). First, in the 1980s there was an increasingly hostile view of the high cost door-
to-door servicing of insurance associated with industrial branch insurance among 
regulators and policy-makers (Alteroff et al, 2004). Second, the introduction of the 
new Financial Services Act of 1986 led to increasing costs to comply with trading and 
staff training standards. Finally, legislation was introduced which allowed for the 
conversion of industrial branch companies to ordinary branch-based insurance 
companies. 
On the supply-side, the high risks involved in delivering insurance to low-income 
households have worked as a barrier for the insurance industry in delivering insurance 
to these households. Low-income households often live in areas where they are at 
greater risk of becoming victims of crime. Households living on council estates are 
two times as likely to be burgled compared to non-council estate households (Safe 
and Demos, 2005). 
Furthermore, considerable research suggests a strong link between deprivation and 
poor health outcomes. In Europe, research has found material poverty to be the single-
most important indicator of life expectancy at birth (World Health Organisation, 
2002). In the UK, death rates from heart disease and lung cancer among people aged 
35 to 64 are twice as high among people from a manual background compared to non-
manual background (Palmer et al, 2006). Further, twice as many people in the age 
group 45 to 64 have a limiting long-standing illness or disability among the poorest 
fifth compared to those on average incomes (Palmer et al, 2006). The figures are 
similar for adults at risk of developing a mental illness (Palmer et al, 2006).  
These risks combined with the relatively small profit margins of offering insurance to 
deprived households make it hard to justify concerted efforts to reach out to this 
segment of the market. Reaching these households is not only likely to involve market 
research, but also the tailoring of products, product delivery and premium collection 
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to their needs. In addition, given their preference for face-to-face sales and the lack of 
other financial products such as current accounts, delivering insurance to this group 
would most likely involve a personalised, face-to-face delivery mechanism and 
possibly complementary financial education and support. 
The barriers we discuss above are largely associated with the social and economic 
characteristics of low-income households as consumers. However, there are also other 
important non-economic barriers to insurance. A criminal conviction can effectively 
prevent a person or the people living with that person from accessing home content or 
other insurance policies (UNLOCK, 2008). Currently there are around 7.2 million 
people on the Offenders Index living in the community, for offences ranging from 
fines and absolute discharges to more serious crimes, such as arson and murder 
(Home Office cf. UNLOCK, 2008). People on the Offender Index have to report the 
offence to insurers for a minimum of 6 months after the conviction (absolute 
discharge) to forever (prison sentences of 30 months or more). 
 “The vast majority of insurers will refuse or cancel any cover for people with unspent 
convictions or a policyholder living in the same home” (UNLOCK, 2008, p.20). In a 
recent study by UNLOCK (2008), the National Association of Reformed Offenders, a 
fictional person with a fine of £250 for an unpaid fine for littering was unable to get 
any quotes for car or HCI with any of the major online price comparison sites due to 
unspent convictions.5 Another example of the impact of this barrier can be found in a 
recent article in the Observer. Jamie Elliot (2009) reports:  
Michelle Barber is paying a high price for not telling her insurer about a 
minor conviction. Her home was wrecked by fire in 2007 and she now faces a 
bill for more than £240,000 because she failed to mention a £150 fine imposed 
three years earlier for an overpayment of benefits. 
Another potential non-economic barrier to accessing mainstream insurance is religion. 
For many practicing Muslims, of which there are over 1.5 million in England 
according to the 2001 census, accessing mainstream insurance policies is at odds with 
their religion because they are incompliant with Sharia law. There are three specific 
aspects of the methodology of conventional insurance that contradict Islamic 
principles (Anwar, 1994). 
First, mainstream insurance provision contains elements of usury or interest (Riba) 
which is not allowed under Islam. According to Islamic scholars, the insurers do not 
share the risk, but “earns the interest on the premiums merely for his service in 
[accurately] predicting the risk for the insured” (Choudhury, 1981, p.1). Also, 
insurance premiums are deposited in interest bearing investments, which is forbidden 
by Islam. 
Second, there is an element of indeterminacy or uncertainty (Gharrar) in terms of 
claims and pay-out under mainstream insurance contracts because the insured does 
not know when or if the event against which he or she is insured will occur. Sales 
involving risk or hazard in which one does not know whether it will come to be or not 
contradicts Islam and Sharia Law. 
                                                 
5 The ABI is currently working with UNLOCK on this issue. ABI is planning to produce good 
guidance for its members in Quarter 4 of 2009. 
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The third element contravening Islamic principles is Maysir, which is the chance of 
total loss to one party in the contract. The insurer himself does not share in the 
pooled-risk of the insured, which in turn is covered by the premiums. 
In light of the non-Sharia compliant nature of mainstream insurance a form of Islamic 
insurance called Takaful has been developed (Box 2.2). 
Box 2.2: Takaful – Sharia compliant insurance 
In response to the non-compliance of mainstream insurance policies with Islamic principles, 
alternative, Sharia compliant insurance policies have been developed. These have been 
distributed and serviced under the term Takaful, which means “guaranteeing each other”. The 
first Takaful insurance company, Sudan Islamic Insurance, was established in 1979 in Sudan. 
Today Takaful insurance is available in over 40 countries (Clarke et al, 2005). 
There are several traits of Takaful insurance schemes that make them compliant with Islamic 
principles. Participants (read policy-holders) pay contributions to the company managing the 
scheme, which are fully or partially donations. The donations are used to pay indemnity when 
the insured risk occurs. The fact that payments are seen as donations is crucial given that 
uncertainty is allowed for donations. Also, uncertainty is also allowed between participants 
with similar interests. Any surplus, after having paid indemnity and expenses of company 
managing fund is to be shared among participants. 
The company managing the scheme must have a Sharia Supervisory Board or committee 
which is “empowered to review the [insurance] company’s practices, contracts, transactions 
and operations” (Anwar, 1994, p.1315). Premium income can only be invested in Sharia-
compliant activities, in other words it does not involve investing in alcohol-related or 
gambling. 
Source: Anwar (1994); Clarke et al (2005) 
2.6. Insurance schemes for the financially excluded in UK 
As we have seen in the preceding section, the access to appropriate insurance policies 
in the UK have been restricted by the deprivation and the consequent neglect of the 
low-income market segment by the insurance industry. In response to this market 
failure, charities, social housing landlords, insurance brokers and insurers have 
developed two types of schemes to improve the access to insurance products among 
consumers with restricted access. 
First, charities have marketed and aided low-income households in applying for 
mainstream insurance products. This approach has been based on the realisation that 
low-income households and a proportion of the elderly have often found themselves 
at a disadvantage in the market place for financial products. Low levels of technical 
competence and confidence (especially in IT and computing), and often a lack of 
understanding of financial products, have hampered these consumers’ ability to take 
advantage of offers on insurance products. After the debt advice charity Christians 
Against Poverty (CAP) closed their insurance broker service Options for Life in 
March 2007, the authors are not aware of any schemes of this particular design in 
operation. 
Second, social housing landlords and charities have marketed insurance products that 
have been tailored to the demand of financially excluded consumers. The rationale 
behind these schemes is that the products available in the mainstream insurance sector 
are unsuitable for low-income households and the elderly. Specifically, there have 
been five aspects of mainstream HCI warranting the design of policies adjusted to the 
needs of the financially excluded: 
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- Minimum sum insured: As both households living on low incomes and 
disadvantaged elderly often have few assets they tend to prefer low minimum 
sums for insurance. Yet a search of HCI on price comparison sites reveals that the 
minimum sum insured for insurers start at £10,000 and some insurers set a 
minimum sum of as much as £20,000.  
- Excesses: For most policies, the policy holder will have to pay an excess in 
relation to claims. This may be especially problematic for households living on a 
low income, because they are likely to make relatively small claims. 
- Payments methods: Most insurers prefer that their policy-holders pay for policies 
via direct debit on a monthly basis, whilst research shows that low-income 
consumers often prefer to pay on a weekly or bi-weekly basis in cash. 
- Age limits: Many insurers, particularly in the case of car, travel, life and to a lesser 
degree HCI, will not insure people above a certain age. 
- Affordability: High minimum sums, penalties for cash payments and differential 
pricing based on postcodes may often make insurance policies unaffordable for 
many financially excluded consumers. 
UK national government policy in promoting access to insurance among the 
financially excluded has mainly centred on increasing the outreach and uptake of 
social housing tenant insurance schemes. Part of the remit of the Financial Inclusion 
Champions – a programme run by the DWP to build and coordinate partnerships to 
promote financial inclusion – is to work with housing associations and social 
landlords in particular geographical areas to increase the supply and take-up of 
appropriate home contents insurance schemes. 
2.7. International microinsurance schemes for the financially excluded 
Internationally, the microfinance and credit union sector has been the main conduit 
for insurance policies for the financially excluded. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
and credit unions have provided formal insurance products to low-income households 
for decades and for semi-formal insurance products in the form of pay-outs linked to 
community savings schemes, as discussed below, for much longer than that. 
There are probably in excess of 100 MFIs distributing insurance policies to millions 
of low-income urban and rural households in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe. 
The Indonesian MFI Bank Rakyat Indonesia alone provides life insurance to over 2.5 
million clients. The around 40 MFIs within the network of Opportunity International 
(OI) serve 3.3 million low-income households in 10 Developing countries.  
To date, most of the MFIs have focused on the provision of credit life insurance – an 
insurance product which covers the loan repayment in the event of the death of the 
borrower – and term life insurance, which compensates a given number of family 
members in the event of the death of the policy holder.  
The preference for these products seems to have been borne out of operational 
considerations, and of the needs and preferences of the target customers of MFIs. On 
the operational side, life and credit life insurance are relatively easy to administer, 
especially if they are compulsory, and there is a limited risk for moral hazard6 
(Churchill et al, 2003). Conversely, the drawbacks of property insurance, namely 
more resource-demanding administration and greater likelihood of fraudulent claims 
                                                 
6 Brown and Churchill (1999, p.22) define moral hazard as “dishonest, careless, or indifferent 
behaviour by a policy-holder that increases the chance of a loss (e.g. negligent maintenance of a sewing 
machine because it is insured)” 
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(Brown and Churchill, 1999), may have contributed to discouraging the extensive 
distribution of such products through the microfinance sector.  
On the demand side, in the absence of a well-developed public safety network, life 
insurance products protecting the rest of the household in the event of the death of the 
head of the household have been proved popular low-income households. This is 
perhaps particularly the case in Southern Africa, where there has proved to be a 
considerable demand for life insurance covering funeral costs among low-income 
households (Leftley, 2005; Leftley; 2006).  
The provision of insurance products through the international microfinance sector has 
principally occurred through four models (Brown and Churchill, 2000; Leftley, 2005): 
- Mutual aid societies: Under this scheme risks are pooled and absorbed by an MFI 
or membership based financial institution. This is essentially a savings scheme 
with a pay-out to customers affected by a specific event, most commonly death. In 
most cases this scheme will involve compulsory savings a certain proportion of 
which will be paid out to affected households. Whilst the combination of savings 
and protection in many cases has proved popular among its customers (Leftley, 
2005), such a scheme has proven to have several drawbacks. It is vulnerable to 
covariate shocks and there is no viable institutional form to allow it to carry the 
risk on its balance sheet (Leftley, 2005). Moreover because of difficulties to price 
the product, owing to the relatively small number of clients of most MFIs, such 
schemes often end up being over-priced and not good value for customers (Leftley, 
2005) 
- Provider model: Many have warned against MFIs adopting this model (e.g. 
Brown, 2002; McCord, undated; Churchill et al, 2003). Insurance provision 
requires considerable institutional and technical capacity. It is inadvisable and 
often not allowed to mix insurance provision with financial services as any losses 
from insurance provision could endanger deposits (McCord, undated).  
- Partner-agent model: This is probably the most common model used by MFIs for 
insurance delivery. In many cases, by working with established insurers MFI may 
actually offer better-value for their clients than they would have been able to on 
their own (Leftley, 2005).  
- Global agency model: A fourth model is establishing an independent 
microinsurance agency which can work and offer insurance products to 
appropriate partner organisations, including MFIs, generic groups (e.g. unions, 
religious organisations) and bonded sub-agents (Leftley, 2005). Opportunity 
International has been operating such an agency since 2005. 
2.8. Summary 
Low-income household in the UK are especially vulnerable to income shocks, as they 
are at greater risk of crime, illness and premature death. They are also often in a weak 
position to sustain and increase their income through the labour market. In addition, 
there are growing economic, fiscal and political pressures for households and 
individuals to finance life-stage and life-cycle costs. Yet, despite their vulnerability, 
low-income households and tenants are much less likely to be insured compared to 
the overall population and particularly compared to the middle to higher-income 
groups. 
These households’ access to insurance is restricted by the social and economic 
characteristics of low-income households as consumers: their tenancy status, low 
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income and peripheral position vis-à-vis financial services makes these consumers 
unlikely to be targeted by cross-selling from the insurance and bank industry. Also, as 
financially excluded or marginalised consumers living on a low income, they are 
likely to demand policies serviced by cash, with no excess and small minimum sums 
insured, which are not widely available in the mainstream market. 
In the UK, attempts to provide insurance to these households have been run by 
charities and social housing landlords. Internationally, MFIs have been spearheading 
provision of insurance to the financially excluded. 
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3. Methodology and research design 
3.1. Research objectives and methodology 
The main objective of this research project is to establish whether CDFIs can be 
effective conduits for insurance products targeted at the low-income, financially 
excluded households. In turn, the effectiveness of CDFI provision of insurance 
depends on three factors: 
- Is there a sufficient latent demand among CDFI clients and target clients to justify 
a CDFI insurance scheme? 
- Are existing insurance schemes aimed at the financially excluded sufficient to 
meet this demand? 
- Do viable models for the delivery of insurance products to excluded households 
through UK CDFIs exist? 
In order to meet the research objectives set out above we developed and applied a 
multi-faceted methodology (Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1: Research objectives and methodology 
Research objectives Methodology 
1. Is there a sufficient demand justify a CDFI 
insurance scheme? 
• Focus groups 
• Literature review 
2. Are existing insurance schemes sufficient to 
meet this demand? 
• UK case study research 
3. Do viable models for the delivery of 
insurance products to excluded households 
through UK CDFIs exist? 
• International case study research 
• Legal framework review 
3.2. Focus groups 
Ultimately, the feasibility of a new product hinges on the willingness among actual 
and potential CDFI clients to purchase such a product. To explore the demand for 
insurance products among target customers, we conducted five focus groups with 31 
target clients and actual clients participated (Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2: Focus groups 
Date Venue Group Participants 
20th 
November 
Lower Kersal Community 
Centre, Salford 
Low-income CDFI target 
clients 
7 
20th 
November 
Lower Kersal Community 
Centre, Salford 
Low-income CDFI target 
clients 
6 
1st 
December 
Somali Brawanese Cultural 
Centre, London 
Somali Brawanese 
community 
3 
8th 
December 
Wild Goose Resource Centre, 
London 
Zimbabwean community 
10 
15th 
January 
Preston Moneyline, Preston CDFI clients 
5 
Total number of focus group participants: 
 
 
31 
The focus groups explored four topics linked to insurance (the completed Topic Guide 
can be found in Appendix C): 
- Attitudes towards insurance and insurers: Trusting that the insurer will pay out if 
the event against which the policy-holder is insured occurs is important. Hence we 
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explored focus group participants’ attitudes towards insurance products and 
insurance companies. 
- Experience with insurers: Past positive and negative experiences with insurance 
companies may influence a household’s decision to take out insurance or not, even 
if it is not their own experience. Thus we asked the participants of their experience 
and that of their friends and relatives with insurance policies and companies.  
- Possession of insurance: We asked focus group participants if they were currently 
insured and if they had been insured in the past. We also discussed reasons for 
having and not having insurance. 
- Ideal protection products and suppliers: At the end of the focus group, the 
participants were asked to describe their ideal insurance product. This included 
cover, how they would prefer to buy the product (i.e. doorstep, face-to-face), 
service it (i.e. direct debit or cash) and who they would prefer to supply it (e.g. 
landlord, third sector lender). 
3.3. UK case study research 
As part of the research project we conducted case studies of three insurance schemes 
aimed at the financially excluded in the UK: 
- Options for Life: This was an insurance broker for term life insurance to 
financially excluded consumers started by and marketed through the debt advice 
charity Christians Against Poverty. 
- Age Concern Insurance: Age Concern has been marketing and selling a wide 
range of insurance products specifically designed for the elderly since the 1980s.  
- Social housing landlord insurance: Social housing landlords have been 
delivering HCI policies targeted at and specially designed for social housing 
tenants for several decades. The case study of social housing landlord insurance 
was generic and did not focus on one specific scheme. 
The review of UK schemes for the delivery of insurance products to low-income 
households is an important part of the study for two reasons. First, they offer an 
indication as to the extent to which existing initiatives are sufficient to cover the 
demand and need for insurance among low-income households. Second, such a 
review can reveal challenges in working with the lower-income market segment, as 
well as good and bad practice in delivering insurance. 
The case study research focused on four aspects of the model: 
- Affordability: This is an important aspect because financially excluded households 
have limited resources to pay for insurance and yet there may often be greater 
costs associated with delivering insurance to this segment of the population (face-
to-face delivery, potentially greater risks of claiming etc). 
- Marketing and take-up: The ultimate litmus test for the provision of insurance to 
financially excluded households is the absolute and relative take-up and the dent it 
makes in the proportion of uninsured households.  
- Additional support and discontinuation: These are important aspects to consider, 
especially because discontinuation on some insurance products can lead to claw-
back of premiums paid in and therefore threaten the sustainability of a scheme. 
- Sustainability: As far as possible we also tried to ascertain the extent to which the 
schemes were financially sustainable. This is important because it would be 
difficult for CDFIs to take on a loss-making insurance provision model. 
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The case study research was based on telephone and face-to-face interviews with 
relevant technical staff and managers of the insurance schemes (see Interview Guide 
in Appendix A). Moreover, where possible we consulted and reviewed studies, 
consultancy reports, business plans and annual reports. 
3.4. International case study research 
We also conducted case study research on five international MFIs that deliver 
insurance. Drawing on the experience of the international microfinance sector in 
providing insurance for the financially excluded is an important component of the 
research. Because many MFIs have already incorporated insurance provision 
alongside microcredit and savings products, their experience may provide a valuable 
insight into the potential institutional impact (human resources, structures and 
processes) of such a move for a community finance organisation. 
However, selecting international microfinance institutions appropriate for comparison 
and conducive for identifying best-practice can be challenging. The market place and 
the regulatory framework within which they operate may often be markedly different 
from that of the UK CDFI sector. Therefore, we developed a set of criteria guiding the 
case study selection: 
- Partner-agency models: The MFI in question would have to operate in 
partnership with an insurer rather than offering insurance on an in-house basis. 
Much of the lessons from in-house schemes are in areas such as reinsurance, 
actuarial science and risk management, which will be not of much use for CDFIs 
as any feasible model in the UK is likely to build on a partnership model. 
- Non-member based MFIs: We decided only to focus on non-member, non-
mutual MFIs. This was partly because member-based MFIs, such as credit unions 
and cooperatives, are often regulated in a very different way from non-member 
based MFIs, and in some cases, they are able to offer insurance products under the 
regulatory radar as member benefits (Churchill et al, 2003). 
- Non-compulsory products: As far as possible we opted for MFIs delivering 
voluntary insurance products. Although compulsory insurance policies are 
administratively less onerous, less costly and often bypass problems such as 
adverse selection, CDFIs are unlikely to offer such products because it would 
contradict the goal of empowering their clients to access financial products 
corresponding to their particular needs. 
- Innovative practices: Emphasis was also put on the development and application 
of innovative practices. Especially we looked for innovation making policies more 
affordable, reducing costs in distribution and marketing, and in reducing risks. 
- Geographic spread: As far as possible, we also aimed at achieving a good 
geographic spread with representation of most parts of the world. However, 
geography was a secondary concern to the potential institutional lessons for 
CDFIs. 
In addition to these criteria, we were also dependent on the availability of 
documentation and on the willingness of MFI management and staff to participate and 
contribute to the research project. 
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After an extensive review of existing web-based documentation and information, we 
conducted case studies of five MFIs (Table 3.3). 
Table 3.3: International MFI case studies 
Institution Insurance products Selection rationale 
ADIE, France Car insurance 
Home multiple risk 
Professional multiple risk 
Public liability insurance 
Rare example Developed country 
MFI delivering insurance 
CETZAM, Zambia Term life insurance 
Property insurance 
Rare example of property insurance 
offered by an MFI 
Pro Mujer, Bolivia Credit life insurance 
Life insurance 
Combines insurance with risk-
reduction interventions 
MIA, Global  Credit life insurance 
Term life insurance 
Crop insurance 
Innovative agency model allowing 
for multiple risk-carriers and delivery 
channels 
WWF, Colombia Term life insurance Rare example of voluntary life 
insurance 
The case study research was based on telephone and face-to-face interviews with 
relevant technical staff and managers of the insurance schemes (see Interview Guide 
in Appendix B). Moreover, where possible we consulted and reviewed studies, 
consultancy reports, business plans and annual reviews. 
3.5. Regulatory framework review 
Ultimately, the ability to provide insurance policies through CDFIs depends on 
whether such a scheme would comply with current legislation. The review focused on 
the possibility of exemption of CDFIs from relevant legislation (as is the case with 
social housing landlords) and on the potential regulatory requirements for CDFIs if 
they were to distribute insurance as a) an introducer, b) an agent and c) a broker. 
As part of the regulatory framework review in-depth interviews were conducted with 
representatives of the Financial Services Authority and relevant regulatory 
documentation. 
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4. Demand for insurance products among CDFI target clients 
This chapter presents the findings of the focus groups concerning possession of and 
attitudes towards insurance conducted with Somali Brawanese, African Community 
Partnership, CDFI target clients and actual CDFI clients. The discussions and many of 
the questions guiding the discussion centred mainly on HCI, but focus group 
participants also discussed other types of insurance, such as extended warranty often 
sold with electrical goods, mobile phone insurance, life insurance, travel insurance 
and car insurance.  
The chapter is organised into seven sections. The two first sections explore the 
attitudes towards and experiences respectively of focus group participants of insurers. 
The third looks at the possession of insurance and the fourth explores reasons for 
having and not having different types of insurance. The fifth looks at how households 
cope with external shocks in the absence insurance, while the sixth section explores 
aspects of ideal protection products in the eyes of the focus group participants. Finally, 
we discuss the implications of the findings for CDFIs wanting to deliver insurance. 
The focus groups revealed that the participants generally held negative views of 
insurance. This was especially the case for the participants with bad experiences. The 
majority, 23 out of 31, of the participants did not have HCI for reasons of cost, bad 
experiences and that they had yet to consider it seriously. The ideal protection product 
was simple, affordable and comprehensive and was sold face-to-face and with the 
option of paying in cash. 
4.1. Attitudes towards insurers 
The attitudes that households hold towards and the experience they have had with 
insurance and insurance companies can play a role in determining whether people 
take out insurance or not. Research suggests that a poor reputation in settling claims 
can severely dampen demand for insurance products (Leftley, 2005). Indeed, the 
findings presented in this chapter indicate that both bad experiences and negative 
attitudes shape people’s propensity to take out HCI. 
When asked about what they immediately associated with insurance, participants’ 
reactions ranged from fairly positive (‘a safety net’) or neutral (e.g. defining insurance) 
to outright negative (‘rip-off’ and ‘a con’), as illustrated by these comments: 
“Are they going to cheat you when you try and claim?” 
Male CDFI target client 
“I just think it’s a safety net really. It is a necessary evil unfortunately, I think, 
in today’s climate.” 
Female CDFI target client 
“Mostly we think about insurance for the house because that’s the main thing 
that you have to have” 
Male, Somali Brawanese community 
“The charge that you pay to have peace-of-mind insurance that your product 
or what you own is working for the next few years.” 
Male, Somali Brawanese community 
The majority of the immediately expressed perceptions and attitudes were negative: 
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“Somebody wanting something for nothing. You pay them a lot of money and 
most of the time you’re not getting anything back.” 
Female CDFI client 
“I think the first thing that comes to mind is rip-off” 
Female CDFI target client 
The negative perceptions of insurance and insurers appeared to be rooted in three 
criticisms. 
4.1.1. Disagreement with principles of insurance 
For some focus group participants their dislike of insurance arose from a 
disagreement with the principles of insurance. This sentiment was particularly strong 
among focus group participants with the African community. The aspect of insurance 
found to be most difficult to accept was that policy-holders would not get this money 
back unless they made a claim on their policy: 
“House insurance as well. If you don’t pay, you lose your money. You pay 
certain amount of money. If you stop paying you lose.” 
Female, African community 
“I don’t like insurance. I paid £399 – £20 a month – and when I stopped 
paying it I lost the money. It isn’t worth it.” 
Female, African community 
“And if you don’t claim, I think they should give you...half or a quarter of that 
money you’ve paid that year” 
Female African community 
“My mother…stopped [paying her life policy] and the [insurance company] 
did not give her back the money she had paid in. So I don’t think what the 
insurance companies are doing is right” 
Female African community 
4.1.2. Distrust in insurers’ handling of claims process   
Many focus group participants did often not believe that insurers would pay out if 
they were to claim.  Insurers, they believed, would use loopholes and fine print to 
avoid having to pay out: 
“There are so many loopholes in the insurance that if one thing is wrong, 
that’s it: you lose all your money.” 
Female, African community 
“The other thing I worry about insurance is what’s the loop holes they’ve 
got…You’re claiming this: Oh you’re not entitled to that.” 
Male CDFI target client 
“All the small writing. You normally don’t know what you’re putting yourself 
into” 
Male CDFI target client 
This is not an unexpected finding. Market research conducted for the Financial 
Inclusion Taskforce revealed high levels of distrust in insurers in particular regarding 
settling and paying out claims (IPSOS Mori, 2007) 
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4.1.3. Biased and unfair premium-setting 
Many focus group participants expressed dismay at the premium setting of insurers 
which they believed were biased against low income areas and vulnerable households. 
In particular, it was felt that insurers would either not insure or demand very high 
premiums of households in certain postcodes, even if the household lived in a safe 
area within the larger postcode area: 
“If you have any mental or physical disabilities, they’ll consider you a high 
risk and they won’t cover you anyway. If you’re very vulnerable, they won’t 
cover you and that’s when you need the help” 
Female, African community 
“If you live in a really bad area, it’s more expensive” 
Female CDFI target client 
“That brings it back to your insurance being about what your postcode 
is…why should someone who lives in Worseley, say, get cheaper insurance 
than somebody who lives in Salford.” 
Female CDFI target client 
One male CDFI target client had filled in a form for HCI through his housing 
association, but he had since not heard from them. He thought that they did not want 
to insure him because of the area he lives in. 
“What I think has happened is that I’ve sent off and put my area down for the 
insurance and what they’ve done is that they’re cherry picking…instead of 
insuring anyone that wants they’ve gone: ‘Well that’s a good area let’s insure 
them.’” 
Male CDFI target client 
In areas at risk of flooding, many focus group participants expressed their dismay that 
insurers penalised people in flood areas even after measures had been taken to reduce 
the risk of flooding: 
“We…have the problem of the flood. We’ve had flood barriers build so we 
know we’re not going to flood, yet the insurance company use that as an 
excuse to put the policy up…So why do they class us as living in a flood plain? 
We don’t anymore.” 
Female CDFI target client 
Moreover, some participants did not believe that insurers had paid out to policy-
holders affected by recent flooding in the area:  
“But what about all the people who have been suffering through the flood and 
everything? They’ve never been paid out, have they? And why is that? 
Because it is obvious they’ve been flooded out.” 
Female CDFI target client 
4.2. Experience of insurers 
Though important, negative attitudes in themselves may not be sufficient to explain 
non-possession of insurance policies. Indeed, negative attitudes did not automatically 
translate into non-possession of HCI, as several participants held negative views of 
insurers but were still insured. Our findings suggest that people’s experiences were 
more important in determining their propensity of having insurance. That said 
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attitudes and experiences may often be related, as negative attitudes towards insurance 
and insurers appeared to be more prevalent among participants who felt they had been 
unfairly treated by their insurance companies. The discussion in the focus groups 
focusing on participants’ experiences with insurers centred on the experience of 
cancelling policies and of making claims on policies. 
4.2.1. Experience of cancelling policies 
Participants’ experiences of cancelling or switching a policy were exclusively 
negative. In one case, a female CDFI target client had to pay £40 in cancellations fees 
for her car insurance, even though she insisted she had not been informed about this 
when she signed the policy: 
“I tried cancelling [my car insurance] and they said I had to pay an extra 40-
odd pound just to cancel it. Thought it was a bit of a rip-off and a con. It was 
not put down in any writing anywhere. 
Female CDFI target client 
In another case, the car insurer of a male CDFI client would not reimburse parts of the 
premium payments even after he had paid the cancellation fee. 
“When you’re buying insurance they’re all nice. When I…cancelled my car 
insurance because I was getting ripped off…They don’t wanna pay [what they 
owe me in paid premiums].” 
Male CDFI client 
4.2.2. Experience of claiming on policies 
Participants’ experiences of claiming on policies were mixed. Some participants had 
positive experiences of claiming. One female CDFI target client had made a 
successful claim on her HCI after her clothes stolen from clothing line: 
“I [made a claim]. I got my washing pinched of the line. All my clothes…I just 
filled the form in and they sent me the money for it” 
Female CDFI target client 
Similarly a male CDFI client making a claim for accidental damage on a carpet: 
“I made a claim 10 years ago for accidental damage to the carpet and that 
went through all right…They changed the whole lot” 
Male CDFI client 
Also, some participants had made successful claims on mobile phone insurance and 
extended warranties: 
“I dropped [the phone] by accident. It’s damaged. I can’t use it anymore. I 
send it back. They sent me a new one.” 
Female African community 
“They fixed my phone [twice]. Because once I dropped it in some water and 
the other time…I think twice I dropped it in some water.” 
Female African community 
However, many of the experiences of making claims on insurance policies had been 
negative. In most cases, the experiences of claiming on a policy were negative 
because their claims had been rejected. These were especially prevalent among 
participants at the focus groups with the African community. Three of the ten 
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participants had made unsuccessful claims on their policies. One participant had 
attempted to claim on her insurance after her car was stolen: 
“My car got stolen so I wanted to claim. I was only the named driver on the 
policy…So I claimed and [the insurer] told me that I couldn’t claim, my aunt 
would have to claim and then when she claimed they found some other rule for 
why they couldn’t pay out” 
Female African community 
Two participants’ claims on their policies for burglary and flood damage respectively 
were also declined: 
 “I [had] home contents insurance some years ago. A thief broke into my 
house and they stole DVD…When I called [the insurer], they said: “I’m not 
covering all that.” So they didn’t give me anything” 
Female African community 
“I had a flood and I tried to claim on my insurance and: ‘No, it doesn’t 
cover.” 
Female African community 
Moreover, one participant had even been victim of outright financial fraud: 
“I paid £250 for life insurance and I realised that the…company is not in 
existence and my money is gone.” 
Female African community 
In some cases, participants felt that even if their claims had been successful, the pay-
out had been insufficient to replace the lost or damaged items. In one case, a female 
CDFI target client had been paid £250 for accidental damage to a sofa she believed 
was worth £1,000: 
“We had to claim on [our HCI]. Just once…But when they came out, my 
couch was worth £1,000, they’d give me like £250. I thought: ‘Well it’s not 
going to buy me a new sofa.’ You could not have repaired it.” 
Female CDFI target client 
Unsuccessful claims appeared to discourage continuation and to, as we discuss in 
Section  4.4, make participants less likely to consider taking out insurance again. All 
the participants who had either made unsuccessful claims or who had received 
insufficient pay-out from their HCI discontinued their policy. The participant who 
made an unsuccessful claim on her car insurance changed to a different provider. 
The way in which claims were processed also contributed to people’s negative 
experiences with insurance. One female CDFI target client had made a claim on her 
travel insurance and disliked the fact that the insurer replaced the item rather than 
paying out cash, as illustrated by the exchange below: 
Female CDFI target client 1: The only [claim settlement process] I didn’t like 
was when we went with [insurance company name]…They don’t actually give 
you money. They replace the goods, which is not that bad…But I just felt it 
was a little bit… 
Female CDFI target client 2: Patronising! 
Female CDFI target client 1: Yeah, because they don’t trust you to give you 
the money. 
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Female CDFI target client 2: At the end of the day you don’t pay your 
insurance in vouchers so you shouldn’t be expected to be paid out in vouchers. 
Another female CDFI target client disliked the fact that the insurer sent out an 
investigator to verify her claim for accidental damage on her sofa: 
“I was a bit disgusted. The fact that they had to send someone out to 
reconstruct how it happened to make sure that [I had not done it on purpose]. 
As if you’re going to do that.” 
Female CDFI target client 
4.3. Possession of insurance 
The extent of insurance ownership was uneven and depended on both the type of 
policies and on the household in question. All participants who owned a car also had a 
car insurance policy, which is not very surprising considering it is a legal requirement 
for car ownership and usage. Only around 5% of vehicles are being driven without 
valid insurance (Greenaway, 2004) compared to 25% of households without HCI. 
In total, 8 out of the 31 focus group participants had HCI. These people were, with 
one exception, home owners and they were generally older households without 
children. Six participants had held HCI policies in the past and two past policy-
holders were currently in the process of getting a new policy or planned on getting a 
new policy in the future. This means that 17 focus group participants were currently 
uninsured and had never had HCI in the past. 
This is in line with national statistics and market research (e.g. IPSOS Mori, 2007; 
ABI, 2007). Home owners are more likely to take out insurance, partly because they 
are more likely to be targeted by cross-selling of financial products in relation to 
acquiring a mortgage or a structural insurance policy (Whyley et al, 1998).  
Among participants who did not have HCI, several took regularly out damage liability 
cover or extended warranty with electrical goods. Participants taking out such cover 
often felt it was a practical way to insure some of their more expensive items in an 
affordable way. Participants from the Somali Brawanese community seemed 
especially likely to take out such cover. We explore this in further detail in the next 
section. 
Only three of the focus group participants had life insurance, though two focus group 
participants expressed an interest in acquiring such a policy. The low proportion of 
participants with life insurance can partly be explained by the fact that most of the 
home owners were not the main bread earners. 
4.4. Reasons for not having home contents insurance  
We now turn to the reasons for why participants did not have HCI. As we discuss 
below, there was often not a single reason, but rather several reasons for why an 
individual did not have HCI. As far as possible, we try and identify the most 
important ones. Focus group participants mentioned three main reasons for not having 
insurance. 
4.4.1. Too high premiums 
Too high premiums were often mentioned as a barrier. Specifically, five participants 
identified costs as the single-most important reason for not having HCI: 
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 “You can’t afford to be insured.” 
Female CDFI client 
“No matter how much we try, it’s just too expensive” 
Female CDFI client 
In particular, for several participants premium payments were not a priority as they 
were just keeping on top of the other bills and costs: 
I’ve just never been able to afford the insurance. There are other things we 
are paying which are more important. I just don’t bother with it. 
Female CDFI target client 
I just can’t afford it so I don’t see the point. I’ve got more important stuff, like 
food bills…as well as gas bills. That’s one less thing to worry about. 
Female CDFI target client 
For two participants, life insurance was a higher priority than HCI. One female CDFI 
target client had already taken out a life insurance policy with her building society. 
She felt that life insurance was more important than HCI because it would provide for 
her children if she should pass away. 
I’d rather have my kids be left comfortable than bother whether a telly get’s 
robbed…because that’s stuff and I could do without that if I can’t afford 
another one. 
Female CDFI target client 
Another female CDFI target client commented that she would consider life insurance 
a greater priority: 
“I’ve thought more about life insurance [than HCI] to be honest. My 
husband’s dad recently died and he’s left everybody enough to be comfortable 
with. If anything happened to me or him [my husband]…it would be nice to 
leave something for the kids. I think that would be more of a priority for me.” 
Female CDFI target client 
Although high costs were frequently mentioned as a reason for not having insurance 
during the focus groups, the findings suggest that the participants may not be as cost-
sensitive as they appear. The clearest indication of this was the extensive use of 
extended warranties, damage liability cover and mobile insurance even though these 
are often costly and of questionable value. 
For example, the monthly premium payments for mobile phone insurance policies 
ranged from £4.50 to £6.99. The policy-holder would also need to pay an excess of 
£25. If a policy-holder makes one claim in the course of a year with the cheapest 
policy, it means that the person will have paid a total of £79 to replace their phone. 
Under the most expensive policy, the policy-holder will have paid £120.88 to replace 
his or her phone. One could question the value of such policies unless the policy-
holder makes several claims in the course of the year. 
Similarly, damage liability covers sold by instalment credit stores are typically very 
costly, which households without HCI often have to get. For example, Brighthouse 
charges £0.82 per week (£127.92 over standard 156 weeks repayment plan) in damage 
liability for a fridge freezer of a value of £457.30. 
Yet eight participants had recently taken out extended warranties with their goods, 
one had taken out a damage liability and three had mobile insurance policies. 
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Moreover, the policies were generally viewed favourably by the people who had these 
policies: 
“I’ve taken out insurance policies. I’ve taken out one for my camera. Basically 
I bought it in 2006 and it was £180. 5-year insurance was £50…I was going 
on holiday the next day so I needed a camera and I wanted to insure it” 
Male, Somali Brawanese Community 
“It’s only 6.99 a month and it’s just like a cover for a phone. Because 
sometimes you can’t afford to buy a new phone. Very rarely can you get a 
phone for £25 [the excess on the policy]. You spend £25 to get a new phone. 
It’s better than not having no insurance…” 
Female African Community 
For participants, they constituted value-for-money as the events covered (e.g. 
breakdown, and damage or loss of mobile phone) were seen as likely to occur with a 
relatively high frequency: 
“I have [extended warranty] for my Hoover. I’ve had that many Hoovers that 
broke so I just took [extended warranty] with the last one that I bought.” 
Male CDFI client 
“I do [have a mobile phone insurance policy]. It’s £4.50 a month. You either 
loose them [mobile phones] or they break. They’re only small” 
Male CDFI client 
 “I got kids at home. Things like microwave or house phone. They always drop 
it on the floor and you constantly keep buying the phone every month…After 
three or five months it’s damaged.” 
Female, African community 
Further, participants found the certainty of claims being met especially appealing with 
mobile phone insurance policies and extended warranties: 
 “I dropped [my mobile phone] by accident. It’s damaged. I can’t use it 
anymore. I send it back…They sent me a new one.” 
Female African Community 
“It’s good. I’ve got mobile phone insurance. I pay every month. It’s £7. If they 
can’t give you the same phone, they’ll send you a new phone. Or if you lost it, 
just go to the police and they’ll send you the new phone” 
Female African Community 
4.4.2. Distrust of insurers and claims settlement process 
Another reason for not having HCI was a deep distrust of insurers, especially 
regarding paying out for claims. For around ten participants this was the main reason 
for having an HCI policy. For the focus group participants with the African 
Community in London, this distrust was especially apparent. This distrust was to 
some extent linked to a more fundamental disagreement that many of the African 
focus group participant seemed to have with the principles of insurance. 
As discussed in Section  4.1, the participants disliked the fundamental principles of 
insurance. In particular, they disliked the fact that they would only get back their 
premiums if they made a claim. This is not surprising. Micro-insurance policies that 
have an investment or savings component have proven particularly popular in African 
and other Developing countries (Leftley, 2005). 
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That said for the uninsured households the distrust of insurers was often secondary to 
cost or other factors. Above all, the distrust of insurers affected those participants with 
bad experiences of claiming on their HCI. All three participants who had either made 
unsuccessful claims or who had received insufficient pay-out from their HCI 
discontinued their policy. 
One female CDFI target client had been paid out insufficient to buy a new sofa 
following accidental damage to it. In addition, she felt criminalised by the insurance 
company for rightfully claiming for an event she was insured against. Ultimately it 
discouraged her from getting a new policy when she moved house: 
“Basically because of that [incident] and when we moved we just didn’t renew 
it. My heart wasn’t with it. I was a bit disgusted. The fact that they had to send 
someone out to reconstruct how it happened to make sure that [I had not done 
it on purpose]. As if you’re going to do that.” 
Female CDFI target client 
The two participants who had experienced rejection of claims on their HCI policies 
for flood damages and burglary discontinued their policies and had never considered 
taking out a new policy: 
“I had a flood and I tried to claim on my insurance and: ‘No, it doesn’t 
cover.’ So I said: ‘That’s it. No more money’” 
Female African community 
“Thief broke into my property and I called the insurance and they said they 
didn’t cover that area. So I stopped paying them” 
Female African community 
4.4.3. Had yet to consider or make enquiry for insurance 
The third and final reason for not taking out HCI raised by participants was that they 
had yet to seriously consider or make enquiries for insurance policy. For some 
participants, the reason for not making enquiries or taking out an insurance policy was 
a lack of understanding of insurance products and the process of taking out a policy: 
“I thought about getting the house insured but I don’t know how you go about 
it” 
Female CDFI target client 
“We don’t understand enough about insurance. We don’t understand the ways 
to go about it properly: where to go, who to get in touch with.” 
Male CDFI target client 
“It’s not like I really want to buy house insurance right now, but I want to 
know how it works” 
Female, Somali Brawanese Community 
“So how does house insurance work?” 
Female, Somali Brawanese Community 
For other participants, they had yet to take out a policy because they had moved house. 
In other words, their non-possession of insurance was a transient state: 
“I’ve just not got around to it because I’ve only just moved into that house. 
I’ve only been there for a few months. But every house that I’ve lived in, I’ve 
had it. So I probably will get it once I get settled.” 
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Female CDFI client 
“I moved from Blackpool…three years ago. I just haven’t got around to it. I 
just didn’t feel I needed it.” 
Male CDFI client 
4.4.4. Other reasons for not having insurance 
In addition to the reasons discussed above, such as negative perceptions, bad 
experiences and cost, we also prompted participants about factors found to be 
important in other studies. For example, the findings of research suggest that a barrier 
to access to insurance is the sector’s insistence on or preference for electronic means 
of transfer for taking out and servicing insurance policies (e.g. Ipsos MORI, 2007; 
Whyley, 1998). However, electronic transfers and direct debits were not mentioned as 
barriers unless prompted. Even when prompted it provoked little discussion, though 
some participants preferred to pay for goods and services in cash. 
Similarly, in contradiction of other studies, we found that very few participants stated 
that their home contents were not valuable enough to warrant taking out an insurance 
policy. Similarly, none of the participants expressed that, in the event of loss or theft 
of possessions and furniture, they would be able to replace them at a lower cost. 
These factors are frequently cited in market research (e.g. Ipsos MORI, 2007). 
Nevertheless, some participants stated that an HCI policy could not replace the items 
of affectionate value. Ultimately, some participants felt, one could manage without 
some items for a period of time. 
Finally, among the three Muslim participants, the issue of incompliance of insurance 
with Islam and Sharia law was not mentioned unprompted. The Somali Brawanese 
community, who are practicing Muslims, were unsure of whether they would be 
allowed to take out conventional insurance under Islam. They thought it had been 
discussed by scholars and that it depended on the scholar as indicated by this 
exchange: 
Male Somali Brawanese: “The thing with Muslims and Islam is quite a few 
people don’t have that much knowledge and in Islam there are a lot of 
differing opinions. Some things are clear-cut: prayer five times a day, 
fasting…With other things…” 
Female Somali Brawanese: “It’s more like different scholars different 
opinions” 
One Somali Brawanese male thought that insurance was not a major concern for the 
Somali Brawanese community: 
“Some scholars think very intellectual. Others are more practical saying: 
‘Look, we’re in the 21
st
 century.’ This is how we interpret it.” 
Male, Somali Brawanese Community 
In sum, the 23 participants without HCI mentioned numerous reasons for not having 
an HCI policy. Five participants did not have HCI because it was too expensive and 
because they felt they had more pressing costs. Ten participants stated that they did 
not trust insurance companies enough to warrant taking out an HCI policy. The 
remaining eight had not got around to it. Payment methods were not mentioned by 
participants unless they were prompted and very few thought they did not have 
enough assets to justify taking out an HCI policy. 
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4.5. Alternative coping strategies 
Given that the majority of participants were uninsured, part of the discussion also 
centred on how they would cope with external shocks in the absence of HCI or other 
relevant insurance policies. Very few focus group participants appeared to have a 
conscious strategy or means to cope with unexpected events, such as fire, burglary or 
other external shocks. When asked what they would do in the event of loss, theft of or 
damage made to their belongings, most participants stated that they had no viable 
means of coping: 
“Apart from what be insured from [landlord]. The actual contents would 
just…You would just have to take the loss wouldn’t you?” 
Female CDFI client 
“Lose everything” 
Male CDFI client 
 “I’d be devastated” 
Female CDFI target client 
One female participant at the African community focus group did not even want to 
consider such a possibility, because ultimately there would be nothing she could do to 
cope: 
 “I wouldn’t want to think about it, because that’s extra pressure on yourself. 
There’s nothing I can do. If I loose those things I just have to give thanks that I 
don’t loose my life or my children, because that’s all that matters, everything 
else is material” 
Female CDFI target client 
One participant thought that the government would come to the aid of uninsured 
households in the event of flood or other natural disasters: 
“If flood was to happen, people that have got house insurance claim on their 
house insurance, but the government would help anyway, wouldn’t they?” 
Female CDFI target client 
There were three ways in which respondents would cope with external shocks. First, 
some respondents would rely on help and assistance from family members.  
“I’d phone my mum” 
Female CDFI target client 
The nature and magnitude of help and assistance from family members was not clear 
and ultimately very few mentioned this possibility. 
Second, in the event of a burglary, some participants stated that they would know the 
culprit and could take appropriate action. One male CDFI client had been burgled and, 
knowing the identity of the perpetrator, the participant went to the house of the person 
in question and retrieved the stolen items: 
“I got burgled. I was told who did it…I went around to this guy’s house and 
all my stuff was sitting in his stuff...I got the stuff back.” 
Male CDFI client 
Similarly, a male CDFI target client would take similar actions if burgled: 
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“If somebody robbed my house, I’d find out who’d done it and went around to 
their house and take it back. Some always know who’s done it, don’t they? 
And I wouldn’t be carrying it back myself” 
Male CDFI target client 
However, this was only raised as a viable strategy by the male participants. The other 
participants stated that even if they knew the culprit they would not be able to get 
their possessions back, as illustrated by this exchange: 
Female CDFI client 1: “You might know [the culprit], but accusing somebody 
is a different matter, isn’t? You can’t really go and…” 
Female CDFI client 2: “Can I have my stuff back please?” 
The third and most common means of coping was to go without certain furnishings 
and gradually build up: 
“It’s not something that I couldn’t live without. If it was my TV, it wouldn’t 
bother me that much” 
Female CDFI target client 
“[I would do the] same as I do every day. Just manage. You just cope, don’t 
you?” 
Female CDFI target client 
4.6. Ideal protection product 
At the end of each of the focus groups we asked the participants to design their ideal 
product or service to protect their household. The participants were asked what the 
product would cover, how it would be sold and distributed, how it would be serviced 
and who would provide it. Most participants took ideal protection product to mean 
insurance so they discussed it in those terms. It is important to note that in this section 
we focus mainly on the uninsured because the insured participants had already 
managed to acquire a policy through mainstream insurance providers. Hence the 
CDFIs would not need to design a policy to comply with their needs as they are 
already being attended to. 
4.6.1. Ideal cover 
In the main participants wanted their ideal protection products to have a 
comprehensive cover. One exception was a female CDFI target client who wanted 
flexibility in insuring specific items: 
“I think it should be like a pick and mix where you can decide yourself. So it’s 
not just one package. Where you can take little bits from each one and make 
your own personal insurance package” 
Female CDFI target client 
The participants generally wanted comprehensive cover in the sense that it would 
cover all contents in the house: 
 “If it is a home insurance it means it covers the whole home regardless” 
Female African community 
“Your washing machine, TV…all of that” 
Female CDFI client 
“House contents and that’s your most usable things you have all the time” 
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Female CDFI client 
In addition to covering all contents, participants also stressed that they wanted any 
policy to be comprehensive, covering all eventualities: 
 “I think if you’re doing life insurance it should cover everything and every 
eventuality. I don’t want to hear that because I broke my neck for dropping 
down of a tree I can’t get it. I think it should cover everything. So if it says 
everything that means if there is a flood, if a tree drops on your house…” 
Female African Community 
“If it is a home insurance it means it covers the whole home regardless of 
whether it is fire, flood, burglary, whatever…It will cover your home. It should 
do what it says without getting too technical, too much fine print” 
Female African Community 
Also, accidental cover was seen as crucial for most participants, especially for those 
participants with children: 
 “Especially with kids. They go around spilling drinks and that” 
Male CDFI client 
“Accidental is a big thing” 
Female CDFI client 
“Accidental, especially when you’ve got kids” 
Female CDFI client 
Furthermore, a number of participants also wanted an ideal HCI policy to cover 
breakdown. This was especially a concern among participants at the Somali 
Brawanese focus group, who also, not incidentally, made extensive use of extended 
warranty: 
“I wouldn’t like it separate. If is would be in just one bundle it would be 
excellent. For theft, breakdown…all these things” 
Female Somali Brawanese community 
“I like something to cover the contents of my house against theft, accidental 
and breakdown.” 
Male Somali Brawanese community 
The preference for coverage to include breakdown and accidental coverage is 
probably a reflection that these eventualities were seen as more likely to occur than 
floods, fires or burglaries: 
“All I’m saying is that our house has been lived in for 15 years now [and] it’s 
never been flooded, there’s never been a fire [and] we’ve never been 
burgled.” 
Male Somali Brawanese community 
4.6.2. Ideal sales and servicing channels 
In terms of purchasing or acquiring their ideal protection products, most participants 
preferred face-to-face interaction with the provider: 
 “Ideally I would like to buy a product face-to-face…At least you know what 
you’re signing and you get documents right there rather than being posted to 
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you or sent by email. All the small writing. You normally don’t know what 
you’re putting yourself into” 
Male Somali Brawanese community 
“I think if you see somebody face-to-face, if you’re not sure about something 
you can ask them about it” 
Female CDFI target client 
 “And you can tell if they’re lying” 
Female CDFI client 
However, some focus group participants were concerned that it would be harder to 
decline a policy being offered face-to-face: 
“I feel it’s harder to say no…because I almost feel it’s a slight on them 
personally if I say no” 
Female CDFI target client 
In terms of servicing a protection product the participants differed in their preferences 
of payment methods and frequency of payments. Some preferred weekly payments: 
“I get paid weekly so weekly would be better for me. I can’t be trusted to save 
it until the end of the month” 
Male CDFI target client 
“I prefer weekly. I divide everything up each week and I put in jars” 
Female CDFI target client 
Other preferred to pay on a monthly or annual basis:  
 “Ideally I’d like to pay it in small instalments. Each month a small amount 
and you can balance your budget” 
Male Somali Brawanese community 
 “I would prefer to have it in one go…at least then I know for…certain year I 
have paid that amount. Instead of paying in instalments. Maybe today you 
have, tomorrow you don’t have…If you find a suitable insurance you really 
want, you might as well pay it in one go” 
Female Somali Brawanese community 
The participants were particularly interested when prompted about insurance-with-
rent schemes: 
“If…it’s an extra £5 a month with your rent going to your insurance then you 
won’t miss it as much” 
Female CDFI target client 
“If [name of housing association] says a pound a week extra and we’ll insure 
you, I’d accept” 
Male CDFI target client 
“That way you wouldn’t miss it” 
Female CDFI target client 
“You don’t feel like you’ve got that other bill, it just goes out with the rent” 
Female CDFI target client 
“I think that’d be a good way” 
Female CDFI target client 
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Generally, as discussed in Section  4.4, the aversion against electronic means of 
servicing an insurance policy via direct debits was secondary to costs and distrust as a 
reason for not having HCI. Nevertheless, a considerable minority of focus group 
participants preferred cash or payment cards to pay for premiums: 
 “I don’t think you should be forced to pay via direct debit if you don’t want to. 
A lot of companies do. They force you into paying, because if you don’t pay 
via direct debit they add on a £3 charge. I just think we’re losing our options 
nowadays…So I think it should go back to options. ” 
Female African community 
4.6.3. Ideal insurance providers 
Three institutions were mentioned most frequently as trusted or preferred providers. 
First, the single-most mentioned provider was the social housing landlord: 
“I wouldn’t have any trouble with my landlord or with my bank. If the 
landlord says…I’d prefer that. Because you can get direct with them. You just 
get on the phone and they’re there.” 
Male CDFI target client 
Second, numerous participants also said they would prefer to take out insurance with 
their bank or building society: 
 “I think I’d go back to my bank…I had [my HCI] with my bank before and it 
was alright” 
Female CDFI client 
Finally, the majority of the CDFI clients would prefer the CDFI to provide them with 
insurance. However, it is important to note that they only said so when this was raised 
as a possibility by the moderator: 
 “If PML were offering insurance I would rather go here than anywhere else 
because I find people here have been good to me. They’ve helped me when 
other people wouldn’t so I would want to come here.” 
Female CDFI client 
“I would [get insurance from CDFI]” 
Female CDFI client 
“I would as well.” 
Male CDFI client 
 “I think [PML] is dirt cheap.” 
Male CDFI client 
Numerous concerns appeared to influence who the participants favoured as their 
provider of insurance. First, many participants would prefer to take out insurance with 
a company or an institution with which they had a long relationship, possibly based 
on trust so trust they would pay out: 
“I would probably trust my building society…I’ve been with them for like 15, 
14 years” 
Female CDFI target client 
Second, for some participants the size of the company was important because larger 
companies were seen as less likely to become bankrupt or default on claim payment: 
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“Me personally I go with [name of insurer] because it is a big company. You 
don’t know with small companies whether you’re going to get paid…I 
basically stay with a reasonably sized company knowing that if I do need to 
claim…” 
Male CDFI target client 
“A big company. One likely not to go bust” 
Male Somali Brawanese community 
Finally, the choice of preferred supplier also appeared to be influenced by the ease 
and convenience of getting in touch with provider: 
“Because you can get direct with them. You just get on the phone and they’re 
there.” 
Male CDFI target client 
4.7. Implications for CDFIs delivering insurance 
The findings of the focus groups suggest that there is a latent demand for, namely, life 
and HCI policies. However, the comments made by the focus group participants 
suggest that meeting target CDFI clients’ expectations of a desirable insurance policy 
is a tall order. Based on the focus group discussions, target clients want a simple and 
comprehensive policy covering all eventualities, including breakdown cover. In 
addition, they want the product to be affordable, though there appears to be a trade-off 
between cost and probability of the event in question, and many would like to at least 
have the option of paying in cash. Preferably, the sales would occur on a face-to-face 
basis, whereby the products and the fine print are well explained. Finally, target 
clients must be able to feel that they can trust that the insurer will pay out in the event 
of a claim and that the claims process is respectful and does not criminalise the 
claimants. 
If a CDFI insurance delivery scheme falls short of one or several of these expectations, 
the CDFI sector risks damaging its reputation and standing among existing and 
potential clients. Indeed, the focus groups revealed very negative attitudes to 
insurance policies and insurance companies, especially among those participants with 
negative experiences with insurers. If CDFIs are to distribute insurance policies, 
clients’ negative experiences with claims settlement or cancellation fees may have a 
negative impact on the reputation of CDFIs, even though it may be the fault of the 
insurance company rather than the CDFI. 
That said, the findings also indicate great opportunities for a well-designed CDFI 
insurance delivery scheme, though potentially more for life than HCI. Face-to-face 
sales and accompanying light-touch advice is a key component of the CDFI business 
model. CDFI frontline staff have built up considerable experience in explaining 
relative complex financial products to people with low financial capability. CDFIs 
already have experience in grappling with the scepticism of target clients towards 
electronic means of transfer and direct debits, and many CDFIs also have a positive 
track record of enticing clients to shift to direct debits.  
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5. Providing insurance to the financially excluded: the UK 
experience 
5.1. Introduction 
In this chapter we analyse and discuss the experience of three UK insurance schemes 
aimed at the financially excluded: Options for Life run by Christians Against Poverty, 
Age Concern Enterprises, and Social Housing Landlord insurance schemes for tenants. 
The review of UK schemes for the delivery of insurance products to low-income 
households is an important part of the study for two reasons. First, they offer an 
indication as to the extent to which existing initiatives are sufficient to cover the 
demand and need for insurance among low-income households. Second, such a 
review can reveal challenges in working with the lower-income market segment, as 
well as good and bad practice in delivering insurance. 
After briefly presenting the schemes, the discussion centres on four important aspects 
of insurance for the financially excluded: affordability and affordability drivers (e.g. 
wholesale purchase, security measures etc), marketing and up-take, additional support 
and discontinuation, and sustainability. 
5.2. Options for Life – Christians Against Poverty 
In light of the difficulties of poor households in accessing insurance and the apparent 
apprehension of the insurance industry to actively market their products to these 
households, a charity called Christians Against Poverty (see Box 5.1) piloted the 
provision of life insurance products to low-income households in 2003. 
Box 5.1: Christians Against Poverty 
Christians Against Poverty (CAP) was founded in 1996 in Bradford by John Kirkby. The 
charity operates through a growing network of centres based around the UK, all opened in 
partnership with a local church. CAP currently has 58 centres across the UK and aims to have 
300 centres by 2021. 
The main services of CAP are a debt counselling service and a budgeting service called the 
CAP account. Through the CAP account, the bills of the account holders are paid for them. 
The account can be set up following a home visit and after agreement has been reached with 
creditors. Currently nearly 1500 clients have an active CAP account. The accounts are 
managed by a centralised unit called the Central Payment Unit. 
To ease pressure on the CAP centres, the charity also operates with two centralised units – the 
Credit Liaison Unit and the Client Support Unit – which negotiate with secondary creditors 
and offer ongoing client support to existing clients with CAP accounts respectively. 
Source: Christians Against Poverty website (www.capuk.org)  
Deemed as a successful pilot, Options For Life (OFL) was created as a private limited 
company in June 2004 to serve as a specialised provider of life insurance products to 
CAP clients. OFL was created as a subsidiary of County Financial, which is owned by 
a CAP board member. The indemnity cover was then extended to OFL. Moreover all 
the legal, auditing and reporting requirements were met by County Financial. 
OFL offered Term Assurance, which pays out a lump sum in the event of the death of 
the policy holder, provided premiums are paid up to date. CAP would market life 
insurance, as a generic product, to its clients through its network of debt advisory 
centres and educate them in the workings and potential benefits of life insurance. If 
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the client was interested in taking out a life insurance policy, the CAP staff would 
pass on the contact details to the OFL staff who would then contact the client in 
question. Using an IFA software programme called Exchange, OFL would find the 
life insurance product and provider most appropriate for the customer in question. 
In addition to marketing the policies, CAP also offered extensive support to policy 
holders to ensure continuation of the policy in the form of debt and money advice. 
Also, most of the policy holders would also have a CAP budgeting account. However, 
a combination of very low uptake, relating to a high risk of premature death among 
target policy-holders, and high policy discontinuation rates led CAP to close down the 
scheme in March 2007. 
5.3. Social landlord tenant HCI schemes 
Because they probably constitute the single-largest group of uninsured households – 
approximately 7 out of 10 of the 6 million social housing tenants in Great Britain – 
social housing tenants are a key target for insurance schemes aimed at the financially 
excluded. Social landlords have been operating tenant HCI schemes for at least 20 
years. 
These schemes are most commonly known as insurance-with-rent schemes, though 
probably only a minority of these schemes actually offer tenants the opportunity of 
paying the insurance premiums with rent. One of the best-known social housing 
landlord HCI brands is the recently launched My Home (box 5.2.) 
Box 5.2: My Home 
The National Housing Federation (NHF) and the insurance broker Jardine Lloyd Thompson 
launched My Home in 2006. My Home is an affordable HCI that NHF members can offer 
their members. To date, over 15,500 tenants of 280 social housing landlords are using My 
Home HCI. 
Source: NHF (Undated) 
The social housing landlord tenant insurance schemes model is a variant of the 
partner-agent model. The insurance company is responsible for manufacturing (price 
setting, product design), reinsurance and claims reserves. The social housing landlord 
is, to varying degrees, responsible for marketing and distributing the home content 
policies. The insurance companies generally negotiate the terms of the scheme and 
liaise with the social landlords through brokers. In addition to supporting the social 
landlord in finding and negotiating the insurance package, social housing insurance 
brokers also offer support tailored to the individual schemes, including promotion and 
marketing, regulatory compliance and scheme management. 
The HCI policy to be offered to the tenants of the social housing landlord in question 
is generally determined through a competitive tendering process. In this process 
insurance companies compete to provide a package of insurance policies (e.g. 
professional indemnity insurance) for the landlord, including tenant HCI policies. 
This bundled approach gives landlords considerable bargaining power resulting in 
competitive offers. The terms for the social landlord tenant insurance is negotiated 
every three years or so. 
The insurance companies operating in this market have developed a generic HCI 
policy for social tenants. Important traits include insurance against bogus callers, low 
minimum sum insured and numerous payment options. Today Royal and Sun Alliance, 
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and Norwich Union are among the greatest social landlord insurers with around 
500,000 policies. 
There is great diversity in the nature and type of social housing tenant HCI schemes. 
This variation is largely due to the extent to which the landlord chooses to execute 
tasks linked to insurance provision in-house or arms-length. In addition to choosing 
between in-house and arms-length schemes, social landlords may chose between 
opting for an in-house scheme whereby insurance premiums are collected with the 
rent and a scheme whereby premiums are collected separately. With-rent schemes 
tend to be more costly for the landlord to set up and administer as it has to separate 
out payments and send them to the insurer and it also carries the dilemma of 
prioritising rent or premium payments. 
5.4. Age Concern 
Age Concern Enterprises Ltd (ACE) – the trading arm of the charity Age Concern 
(Box 5.3) – has been offering insurance to elderly households since 1986. Today it 
offers a wide range of insurance policies: 
- Funeral plan: Transport and treatment of diseased, coffin, hearse, funeral director 
and contribution towards cremation/burial fees, doctors’ fees for certificates and 
minister and officiant’s fees. 3 different plans. Can be paid in single payment 
(£2,025-2,495), 12 monthly payments (£168.75-207.92) or 60 monthly payments 
(£38.95-48). 60 payments carry an extra total charge of £312.25-384.72. 
- Home insurance: Provided in partnership with Fortis Insurance Limited for 
people over 50. Includes new-for-old cover, HCI or building or both, and small 
excess (typically £25). Building pays out up to £400,000, content pays up to 
£100,000 for household goods, valuables, money, credit cards and personal 
belongings in home or garden + up to £50,00 to pursue or defend legal disputes for 
extra cost. Accidental damage at extra cost. 
- Life insurance: Provided in partnership with AXA Sun Life plc. Guaranteed 
access for people aged 50-85. Once paid into plan for 2 years guaranteed fixed 
lump sum paid out on death. If used before 2 years, then premiums returned + half 
total sum of premiums. Fixed premiums from £7 per month (up to £37) 
In addition, ACE also offers car and travel insurance. 
Box 5.3: Age Concern England 
Age Concern England is a Federation of over 400 local charities aimed at promoting the well-
being of all older people. Founded in 1944 under the name the National Old People's Welfare 
Committee (NOPWC), the federation was renamed Age Concern in 1971. In spring 2009, 
Age Concern merged with Help the Aged. 
Age Concern England works to promote the well-being of the elderly in numerous ways 
including influencing policy, national information and advice campaigns, influencing markets 
and addressing market failures affecting the elderly (mainly through supply of insurance 
products), and by supporting local Age Concern charities financially and through advice and 
technical support. 
Locally, Age Concern Charities have a wealth of services targeted at the elderly, including 
information and advice on a wide range of issues (e.g. health, public services, housing and 
financial services), befriending and related support services, and advocacy services. 
Source: Age Concern website 
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The main reason for starting to provide insurance was that existing products did not 
cater for many elderly customers. The first product ACE launched was an HCI policy. 
A key problem with mainstream HCI policies was that the vast majority of insurers 
only offered products with large minimum sums insured. ACE then moved on to 
offering travel insurance. Obtaining appropriate cover for travel for the elderly in the 
mainstream market is problematic. In particular, mainstream policies often do not 
included full cover for health and pre-existing conditions, and in some cases there is 
an upper age limit. 
ACE’s policies offer full health cover, cover pre-existing conditions. ACE does not 
have an upper age limit on any of their policies. ACE’ HCI policies automatically 
cover lift chairs, carers’ belongings, wheel chairs and borrowed medical equipment 
often not covered by mainstream policies. 
ACE works in partnership with the insurer Fortis who underwrites the policy. The 
policy has been designed by ACE specifically for the elderly. The products are sold in 
three ways: through local Age Concern charities; through phone sales; and through 
the internet. The latter is the fastest growing. Around 150 local Age Concern charities 
can sell ACE insurance products as trading alliance partners. The trading alliances are 
governed by individual trading agreements between ACE and the local Age Concern 
charity in question. The local charities are appointed representatives to promote Age 
Concern insurance policies. They can also collect premiums and provide customers 
with personal quotation. 
The exact arrangements for the sale of the policies vary from charity to charity. In 
some charities they have staff members dedicated solely to the sale of insurance while 
in other charities the sale of insurance is just one along with other tasks. 
5.5. Discussion 
In the preceding sections we outlined the structures, processes and product design of 
the insurance schemes in the study. However, a more important question is how 
effective these different schemes are. Hence in this section, we discuss the merits of 
the schemes in terms of affordability, marketing and up-take, additional support and 
discontinuation, and sustainability. 
5.5.1. Affordability 
Affordability is a key concern for insurance schemes aimed at the financially 
excluded. Financially excluded households often live in areas at relative high risk of 
burglary and they are also at greater risk of premature death, factors which drive up 
costs and risks for insurers. Yet the financially excluded often live on low and 
fluctuating incomes. Hence a key challenge for insurance schemes is to find 
mechanisms for ensuring that premiums are affordable. 
The cost of premiums of Social Housing Tenant insurance is often lower than 
equivalent products in the mainstream insurance market. This is especially the case 
for tenants living in high-risk postcodes: 
“What we do know is that our…insurance is considerably cheaper than 
anything you get on the mainstream market. The… scheme is very cheap if you 
live in a high-risk postcode.” 
Operations Manager – Customer Services Team, Great Places Group 
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This relative affordability of social housing HCI appears to be driven by three factors. 
First, because social housing landlords negotiate tenant insurance along with other 
forms of insurance, they have considerable bargaining power in view of the size of the 
housing stock, which results in lower premiums. 
Second, according to an interviewee from a major social housing insurer, the 
insurance companies trust the social housing landlords to strive to implement and 
improve risk reduction measures. In 2003, the insurance company in question did not 
raise the HCI premiums for the tenants of a social housing landlord in Glasgow 
following the flood despite the subsequent massive claims. According to the insurer, 
this was because the landlord took action to fix the drainage to prevent or mitigate 
effects of future floods. 
A final driver of affordability is a good claims performance. Because of tenants’ 
affinity with their landlords tenants often do not make small claims. Indeed, according 
to a representative from a social housing landlord insurer, social housing insurance 
schemes perform better than most standard policies. 
Generally, in-house schemes tend to be more expensive than arms-length schemes, 
because the landlord will typically charge commission to cover administrative costs. 
However, as discussed in Section  5.5.2, these schemes tend to have a higher take-up 
and greater continuation rates. 
Conversely, OFL, the only scheme distributing mainstream insurance products, 
struggled to find affordable life insurance policies for their clients, given the poor 
health of their clients. Indeed, as we discuss below, only around 20% would qualify 
for a life insurance policy with any insurer. 
That said an interviewee from a social housing landlord insurance broker argued that 
the lower income market is not particularly cost sensitive. The focus group findings 
would support this (see Section  4.4). Further, research into low-income consumers 
often confirms that they are not very cost-sensitive, which is surprising considering 
their low incomes. More important than the overall cost or price, is that premium or 
loan repayments are made in manageable weekly payments. Moreover, other 
considerations such as cover, payment methods, simplicity and transparency, 
minimum sum insured and excesses are almost as important for low-income 
consumers as affordability. 
5.5.2. Marketing and up-take 
Take-up and marketing and promotion are crucial and inter-linked aspects of 
insurance schemes aimed at financially excluded consumers. A high up-take is 
important for the financial and operational sustainability of insurance schemes 
through benefiting from economies of scale. Also, up-take is an important indicator of 
impact, reducing absolute and relative number of uninsured households. In turn, as 
discuss below, marketing and promotion influence take-up. 
OFL experienced considerable interest in taking out life insurance among CAP clients. 
According to CAP figures, 60-70% of CAP clients (i.e. individuals with CAP 
accounts) took the first steps towards taking out a life insurance policy. Nevertheless, 
only between 13 and 19% of those reached a point where taking out such a policy 
would be possible. 
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Table 5.1: Take-up OFL 
 2004 2005 2006 
New CAP clients 
 
748 859 1,139 
Number of life insurance 
policies issued 
100 155 216 
Percentage taking up life 
insurance 
13 18 19 
Source: Friends Provident Foundation (2008) 
Notes: New CAP clients are defined as those that open up a CAP account 
This low success rate was largely caused by the high prevalence of health problems 
among CAP clients. Mental health issues were particularly prevalent, with around a 
quarter of CAP clients having attempted suicide or having had suicidal thoughts,7 in 
which case a 6 month cooling of period was automatically applied.  
Low up-take has traditionally been the Achilles heel of social housing landlord with-
rent and not-with-rent schemes in the UK (Demos and Safe, 2005; Hood et al, 2005; 
New Policy Institute, 2007; Vestri, 2007). According a representative from the 
insurance industry, out of the approximately 6 million social housing tenants, 3 
million are considered to be in play, whilst the remaining 3 million either already 
have insurance with another provider or are not interested in taking out a policy. 
Because a social housing tenant insurance scheme is considered to be reaching market 
saturation at an uptake level of 25% of tenants, this means that nationally social 
housing schemes should aim for 1.5 million HCI policies. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to accurately ascertain the relative take-up across the 
social housing schemes because there is not single database where such information is 
collected. According to estimates provided by an interviewee representing a social 
landlord insurer, the two largest social housing insurers have around 500,000 
customers or 10% of social housing tenants. 
According to an interviewee from a major social housing broker, the average up-take 
of social housing landlord HCI insurance schemes is around 17%. However, this 
average figure hides considerable variation in up-take for the different schemes, 
which ranges from 2-3% to 30%. According to the interviews, this variation is mainly 
accounted for by the emphasis put on promoting and marketing the scheme by the 
landlords: the landlords that to a greater degree promote HCI have greater take-up. 
The interviewees identified four key reasons for low up-take of insurance among the 
financially excluded despite the existence of schemes catering to their needs. First, 
there is often a deep-rooted distrust among low-income households of insurers. This is 
largely corroborated by the focus groups and other market research (e.g. Ipsos MORI, 
2007). This distrust may in some cases arise from consumers own bad experience 
with insurers, but more often it is probably driven by stories of the bad experiences of 
other people. Negative stories of failed claims travel fast in local communities, 
according to an interviewee from a social housing landlord broker.  
Second, many low-income households believe that they do not have enough assets to 
warrant an HCI policy. This is echoed by a recent market study by Ipsos MORI (2007) 
which found that even if uninsured consumers considered that they had sufficient 
assets to warrant taking out a home content insurance policy, they often believed they 
                                                 
7 OFL defined these as suicidal thoughts expressed to GP or other health personnel. 
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could replace these items cheaply without insurance by drawing on relatives and 
charity shops.  
Third, the interviewees from a social housing landlord highlighted that a lot of tenants 
mistakenly believe that they and the contents of their accommodation are protected 
against a range of incidents, such as leaking pipes. 
A fourth reason for low up-take of HCI among Great Places tenants is believed to be 
that many elderly tenants already have taken out an HCI policy with Age Concern. 
This makes increasing up-take all the more challenging as generally the elderly are 
believed to have greater propensity to take out HCI. 
5.5.3. Additional support and discontinuation 
Discontinuation of policies is a potentially serious problem for insurance schemes 
targeting the financially excluded. Financially excluded households often have 
tenuous links to the labour market, making them go in and out of employment. Given 
an often slow response time of the benefit system, this often leads to disruption in the 
income stream jeopardising steady payments perceived as non-essential, such as 
insurance. This is problematic as discontinuation means that the household is no 
longer covered for the event in question.  
Even so, none of the schemes reviewed operate with support arrangements explicitly 
designed to aid policy-holders continue premium payments despite financial 
difficulties. This is likely to be a product of the fact that in none of the specific 
schemes which we reviewed are the housing associations or charities in charge of 
collecting payments. It is possible that insurance-with-rent schemes, where the social 
landlord is responsible for premium collection, are more conducive for support 
arrangements. 
That said one scheme operates with a support scheme which, although not explicitly 
put in place to support policy holders, helps them manage their money and to put 
aside money for insurance premiums. CAP would offer generic money advice as well 
as debt advice. In addition, CAP offers budgeting accounts which their clients may 
pay in a monthly amount which CAP uses to pay their clients bills. As part of that 
CAP would maintain a two month buffer in order to ensure continuation of policy.  
However, it was very challenging and costly in terms of administration to keep this up. 
Moreover, when in financial difficulties, which was not uncommon given that CAP 
clients (the OFL client pool) came for debt counselling, premium payments would 
often be the first to be sacrificed. Therefore, despite these fairly extensive support 
mechanisms, over a two-year period 40% of policies would be discontinued.  
Moreover, according to an evaluation of the scheme (Friends Provident Foundation, 
2008, p. 2) “42 per cent of [CAP] accounts [per March 2007] had insufficient funds, 
and if CAP had not put resources into monitoring and managing this ‘buffer’ system 
these clients may have lost their life insurance policy. The reported cancellation rate 
was therefore significantly lower than it would have been without high levels of 
support from CAP.”  
The existence of support schemes for social housing landlord HCI depend on the 
social landlord. My Home lapses within an arrears catch-up period of six weeks. So 
there is some room for policy-holders to get back on track with payments. In addition, 
often social landlords will guarantee access to money and debt advice within a certain 
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time-frame (typically 10 working days) for its tenants through agreements with debt 
advisory agencies.  
5.5.4. Sustainability 
The financial sustainability of insurance schemes aimed at low-income financially 
excluded households is of crucial importance. Ultimately the prospect for financial 
sustainability may determine the feasibility of delivering insurance through the CDFI 
sector.  
Although OFL was shut down in 2007 for not being an effective means of promoting 
access to life insurance among CAP clients, its demise hides a highly innovative and 
initially financially sustainable insurance delivery model. OFL broke even financially 
in its first 18 months of operation. The OFL model is illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The stippled horizontal line at the centre of the figure represents the break-event point 
for an insurance provision scheme targeted at low-income, financially excluded 
clients, such as those of CAP and OFL. Above the break-event point a scheme makes 
a profit, while below it the scheme makes a loss. 
The target clients of OFL constitute a market segment that is costly and hard to reach. 
They tend to have low levels of financial capability and understanding of insurance 
and other financial products, and they prefer face-to-face contact as opposed to 
internet and telephone. The notion that insurance products have to be actively sold 
and marketed is especially true for these households given their high levels of distrust 
of insurers and financial institutions in general. 
Using a standard insurer-agent model on the above-described market segment it is 
unlikely that OFL would have been able to break-even, as illustrated by the stippled 
horizontal line below the break-event point. Therefore the key to sustainability of the 
OFL model was that OFL transferred costs and tasks to its partner organisation, CAP. 
CAP marketed the services of OFL and generic life insurance, educated its clients in 
Insurer-agent model 
Break-even point 
Loss-making 
Surplus-making 
Insurer-agent-partner model 
CAP (Partner organisation) 
Cost transfer (marketing 
costs, financial education, 
additional support 
Figure 5.2: The OFL model 
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principles and mechanics of insurance, and supported clients through budgeting 
accounts and money advice. In other words, CAP carried part of the acquisition costs. 
This allowed OFL to break even as depicted in Figure 5.2. 
Ultimately, it was the high discontinuation rate and the consequent claw-back of 
commissions – the income base of OFL – that rendered the model unsustainable. In 
the case of life insurance policies, the companies can claim back all commission paid 
in if the policy is discontinued within the first four years. 
Financial sustainability has been less of an issue for social landlord insurance schemes, 
as the promotion of HCI has been motivated by a concern for the welfare of tenants. 
With the exception of the insurance-with-rent schemes, the social landlords do not 
charge any commission. With-rent schemes are more costly to the social housing 
landlord to set up and administer as it has to separate out payments and send them to 
the insurance company and it also carries the dilemma of prioritising rent or premium 
payments. 
5.6. Implications for CDFI insurance delivery 
The results of the focus groups were indicative of a latent demand for insurance 
policies. To what degree do the existing UK schemes meet this demand? 
Unfortunately, the lack of data makes it difficult to ascertain whether the existing 
schemes are making inroads in lowering the proportion of uninsured households. In 
terms of the social housing landlord schemes, the estimates provided would indicate 
an average take-up of around 10%.  
The ABI (2007) reports that despite the fall in costs in real terms of around 40% from 
1994 to 2007, the proportion of the population with home contents and building 
insurance has remained relatively stable. This seems to be confirmed by data cited by 
Demos and Safe (2005). Between 1994/1995 and 2003/2004 the proportion of 
registered social landlord tenants fell from 63.4% to 59.2%, but the proportion of 
council tenants without insurance increased from 54.4% to 60.8%. The data from the 
most recent FRS suggests that the proportion of social tenants without insurance has 
remained stable at around 64%. 
The interviewees highlighted four issues that CDFIs must grapple with to make a dent 
in the number of uninsured households. First, they must overcome a deep-rooted 
distrust among low-income households of insurers. Second, many low-income 
households believe that they do not have enough assets to warrant taking out an HCI 
policy. Third, a lot of tenants mistakenly believe that they and the contents of their 
accommodation are protected against a range of incidents, such as leaking pipes. 
Finally, many elderly tenants, who have a greater propensity to take out insurance, 
have already taken out an HCI policy with Age Concern, leaving mainly the hard-to-
reach consumers. 
Also, simply relying brokering existing mainstream products is challenging as often 
end up being too costly, as OFL experienced, and as they are not adjusted to the needs 
and wishes of low-income consumers. Rather, a more sensible option would appear to 
be rolling out a generic no-frills HCI policy similar to those developed for social 
housing landlords. The affordability of such policies is a function of three factors: the 
bargaining power of social landlords as corporate clients and in view of housing stock, 
the implementation of security measures and good claims performance.  
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Achieving affordable insurance products may prove to be a major challenge for 
CDFIs in that they have a much smaller target client base compared to social housing 
landlords. Another potential threat to maintaining affordability and at the same time 
ensuring that delivery costs are covered is the insistence on the part of numerous 
insurance companies on the use of insurance brokers. If both the broker and the CDFI 
charge a commission to cover delivery costs, the premiums paid by the clients may 
end up costing more. 
In terms of sustainability, the main lessons come from Age Concern and OFL, as 
social housing schemes put less emphasis on recovering costs. A key lesson is that 
cost transfers through effective partnerships can be vital in reaching sustainability. 
However, finding appropriate partner organisations may prove challenging given that 
social housing landlords, one of the main partner organisations of the CDFI sector, are 
already delivering their own insurance product. Another important lesson from the 
case of OFL is the need to have a mechanism to offset or deal with claw-back in the 
case of life insurance policies. 
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6. Providing insurance to low-income households: the experience of 
international MFIs 
6.1. Introduction 
In this chapter we review the experience of five microfinance institutions (MFIs) in 
distributing insurance (Table 6.1). Drawing on the experience of the international 
microfinance sector in providing insurance for the financially excluded is an 
important component of the research. Because many MFIs have already incorporated 
insurance provision alongside microcredit and savings products, their experience may 
provide valuable insight into the potential institutional impact (human resources, 
structures and processes) of such a move for a CDFI. 
Table 6.1: International MFI case studies 
 ADIE Pro Mujer WWF MIA CETZAM 
Country 
 
France Bolivia Colombia Global Zambia 
Year start 
 
2007 2007 2003 2005 2001 
Products Property 
Sickness & 
accident 
Vehicle 
Indemnity 
Credit life 
Term life 
Term life Credit life 
Term life 
Funeral cover 
Crop 
Property 
Term life 
Credit life 
After briefly presenting the five schemes, the discussion centres on the institutional 
and client impact of incorporating insurance policies alongside existing microfinance 
services. 
6.2. ADIE 
Since July 2007, the French MFI ADIE (see Box 6.1) has been offering voluntary 
microenterprise insurance products to active borrowers in four French regions: Ille-
de-France, Midi-Pyrénées, Poitou-Charentes and Limousin. In 2009, ADIE aims to be 
offering insurance nationally. 
ADIE decided that it needed to offer insurance products to its clients after a survey of 
600 clients in 2006 revealed a number of barriers faced by low-income micro-
entrepreneurs in accessing insurance. Mainstream business insurance policies were 
too expensive for most of ADIE clients. Moreover, insurance companies are often 
reluctant to offer insurance to small businesses for less than £850. In terms of 
construction insurance, there is little competition for start-up businesses, with only 
one insurance company operating in this market. Consequently it is costly to take out 
such insurance. 
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Box 6.1: Association pour le droit a l’initiative économique (ADIE) 
ADIE, a French MFI, was founded in 1988 to provide microcredits and business support to 
low-income, financially excluded microenterpreneurs and to create a more conducive 
legislative and regulatory environment for microcredit provision and microenteprise 
development. With its 130 agencies and 380 offices, ADIE covers the whole of France 
including its overseas departments.8 It has 369 paid staff members and over 1,000 volunteers. 
ADIE offers three microcredit products for start-ups and existing microenterprises. First, it 
offers microcredit of up to £4,760 for a maximum of two years at an interest rate of 9.71% 
and a fixed fee of 5%. ADIE made nearly 10,000 such loans in the course of 2007 making it 
the single-biggest credit line with an outstanding loan portfolio of £26.8 million. Second, it 
offers interest-free loans for a maximum of 4 years, though with a fixed fee of 5%, for 
purposes not covered by main microcredit range. In 2007, ADIE made nearly 2,400 such 
loans. This credit line has an outstanding loan portfolio of £10.8 million. Finally, ADIE is 
currently piloting a microcredit to facilitate the entry of low-income individual into the labour 
market. This covers mobility costs (transport, driver’s licence) and vocational training. All 
micro-credit products are individual loans, though some have group guarantees attached to 
them. 
In addition to microcredits ADIE offers individually tailored and generic courses on a range 
of topics, including computing, accounting, business plan and marketing. In 31 centres in 13 
regions of France, ADIE clients can also access and use computers.  
The clients of ADIE are living on a low income, with limited skills and with none or tenuous 
links to the labour market. Out of its clients, 43% are on means-tested benefits, 43% are 
unemployed, 14% are low-income workers and 21% have low literacy. The key objective for 
ADIE is that its clients graduate to start using mainstream financial services. For example, 
ADIE borrowers can only use ADIE for a maximum of 3 years before they have to move on 
to a mainstream financial institution. 
Source: ADIE (2007), ADIE (2008) 
Specifically, ADIE offers four insurance policies. First, the home multiple risk 
insurance pays out £26 per day for up to 3 months in the event of problems leading to 
discontinuation of production or sale or service delivery. It also pays out up to £3,460 
for stolen goods and furniture, and up to £8,660 in the event of fire. The annual 
premium for this product is between £170-260. Second, the professional multiple risk 
insurance pays out £26 per day for 3 months for sickness or accidents at an annual 
premium of £170-260. Third, ADIE sells a vehicle multiple-risk insurance policy. 
Finally, ADIE offers a 10-year indemnity insurance policy for construction and home 
repair and improvement companies, which is mandatory in France. There are three 
annual premium bands for this product: £950 for minor home improvement work, 
£1,385 for plumbers and £2,340 for big construction projects. 
ADIE works in partnership with AXA France and Macif, part of the AXA group. 
ADIE and AXA France and Macif designed the product specifically for ADIE clients 
together. The product is marketed as an ADIE-branded insurance. ADIE markets, 
sells, sets up the insurance contract and collect the premiums. AXA France and Macif 
are responsible for providing actuarial capacity, reinsurance, and for verifying, 
settling and paying out claims. In the event of sickness, there is a process of self-
reporting based on a note from a doctor. 
For all policies, the annual premium is paid in full a year in advance with a loan from 
ADIE. A client can have an ADIE insurance policy for up to 3 years before they have 
                                                 
8 Nouvelle-Calédonie, Guadalupe, Martinique, Réunion Mayotte and Guyana. 
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to move on to a mainstream insurer. This is because graduation to mainstream 
providers is a key objective of ADIE. Ten percent of the loan (the principal), or in 
other words the premium, goes to the insurance company to cover the administrative 
costs of the insurance scheme. 
6.3. Pro Mujer 
Since 2007, Pro Mujer Bolivia (see Box 6.2) has been offering two insurance products 
to its clients. The first is a credit life policy which pays the debt of the client of up to 
£6,100 in the case of death (decreasing principal). The second policy is individual 
term life insurance, under which the relatives of the client are paid a lump sum just 
over £500, in the case of the death of the client. Both policies are mandatory for and 
exclusive to active borrowers. The monthly premium is £0.18. 
Box 6.2: The Pro Mujer Network 
The Pro Mujer network was founded in 1990 by Lynne Patterson and Carmen Velasco. It is a 
microfinance network that offers credit, access to saving accounts, healthcare, and training to 
poor women entrepreneurs in Latin America. The Pro Mujer network currently operates in 
Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru. 
Pro Mujer was first established in Bolivia in 1993. Today Pro Mujer Bolivia has 700 
employees and 25 offices in 8 of the 9 provinces of the country. Pro Mujer Bolivia is an MFI 
that offers both financial and non-financial services.  
Per June 2008, Pro Mujer Bolivia had 101,976 clients (savers and borrowers), an outstanding 
loan portfolio of £14 million and a savings portfolio of £5.5 million. The average loan size is 
around £150. The portfolio has grown by 54% over the last year. Over 90% of loans made are 
made using the Grameen Bank solidarity group methodology 
For a monthly fee of £0.30, clients are entitled to health services delivered by a team of 
doctors and nurses at Pro Mujer Bolivia’s neighbourhood centres, including cancer and 
sexually transmitted diseases screening, vaccinations and treatments for respiratory infections 
and diarrhoea. 
Pro Mujer Bolivia also offers day-care facilities, four computer centres in two locations where 
clients and teenagers learn computer skills and young children learn basic skills – reading, 
writing and math – and English lessons. Finally, Pro Mujer Bolivia offers legal education and 
support, helping women to become aware of their rights and know how to get help if needed, 
in cases of domestic violence. 
Source: Velasco and Chiba (Undated), Pro Mujer website (www.promujer.org)  
The life and credit life insurance policies are delivered in cooperation with the 
Bolivian commercial insurance company La Vitalicia, part of the BISA group. This 
partnership was developed and formalised over a four-month period. In the beginning 
of 2007, Pro Mujer Bolivia chose to work with La Vitalicia following discussions 
with several insurance companies. For Pro Mujer Bolivia it was important that La 
Vitalicia recognised the social merits of delivering insurance to low-income client 
households.  
In the period January-March, La Vitalicia designed a product with input from Pro 
Mujer Bolivia and the structure of the partnership was determined. The policies were 
piloted in the provinces of La Paz and El Alto May to August 2007. In August the 
policies were rolled out in all the provinces where Pro Mujer operates and today 
around 90% of clients, or 80,000 clients, are insured. 
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The division of responsibilities under the partnership arrangement is as follows. The 
insurance policies are marketed and sold by the loan officers who help the clients fill 
in the application forms which is sent to La Vitalicia. The loan officers do not receive 
bonuses for selling insurance, but are instead rewarded based on targets for new 
borrowers, client retention and for the quality of the loan portfolio.  
Pro Mujer Bolivia collects the premiums with the loan repayments and pays La 
Vitalicia every two weeks. In terms of claims management, the relatives of the clients 
inform Pro Mujer about the death. Pro Mujer Bolivia then verifies the claim, helps the 
relatives fill in the questionnaire and sends it off to La Vitalicia. Once the claim has 
been registered, the insurer sends a cheque to the MFI who passes this on to the 
relatives of the client. The insurer is responsible for reinsurance and for keeping 
claims reserve. 
Any losses or profits are shared by the insurer and the MFI on a 50/50 basis. To date, 
Pro Mujer Bolivia has been able to cover all its insurance delivery costs with income 
from the premiums. 
6.4. CETZAM 
CETZAM (see Box 6.3) offers three insurance policies: a credit-life policy, a funeral 
(term life) insurance policy and a property insurance policy. All the policies are 
compulsory. The premiums for all the policies are deducted from the disbursed loan. 
The insurance policies cover the period of loan, which is normally 16 weeks, plus an 
additional two weeks. 
Box 6.3: Christian Enterprise Trust Zambia (CETZAM) 
CETZAM was created in 1995 as an NGO to combat poverty through microenterprise 
development. CETZAM became implementing partner of the international microfinance 
network Opportunity International (see Section  6.5 for further information) in 1996 in order 
to become “sustainable, formal, regulated financial institution” providing microfinance 
services to low-income households in Zambia (Leftley, 2005, p.14). CETZAM started lending 
in 1998. 
In the following years, CETZAM embarked on a DFID-funded expansion to enable the MFI 
to become sustainable and to operate on a national scale. However, CETZAM went through 
restructuring in 2002 and 2003 leading to a reduction in the number of branches and 
customers (from 20,000 to 3,000 by end of 2003) following a high PAR (at around 5.4%) and 
an operational sustainability ratio as low as 35.4% (Leftley, 2005). Ultimately, the expansion 
was shelved in early 2003 due to poor performance. 
Today CETZAM has in excess of 2,800 active clients, 72% of which are women. Its 
outstanding loan portfolio is £1.2 million and the average loan size is £530. It offers a wide 
range of microfinance services to its clients. In addition to credit life, term life insurance and 
property insurance, the MFI offers individual and group loans. 
Source: Opportunity International Website (www.opportunity.net), Leftley (2005) 
CETZAM first decided to look into offering term life insurance or funeral cover in 
2000, when market research into its customers revealed a strong demand for life 
insurance covering the costs of funerals in particular. Forty-one percent of clients 
experienced at least one death in their extended family each year and funeral costs 
averaged 3-6 months salary (Chu and Hazell, 2007). Moreover, existing mainstream 
insurance policies were found to be prohibitively expensive. 
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CETZAM approached the national insurer, NICO Insurance Company, shortly after 
the market research was completed. At the end of 2000 a funeral insurance product 
called Ntula was piloted in Kitwe in Northern Zambia. During the pilot-phase, Ntula 
was provided through a local insurance agent. In 2002, CETZAM became an agent 
for NICO and began offering insurance to all clients. CETZAM claims 20% of 
commission on premium payments. Initially CETZAM was only responsible for 
marketing, sales and premium collection, but due to slow processing of claims the 
agreement was amended enabling CETZAM to settle and pay out claims. 
The property insurance is restricted to insuring items used as collateral for an 
individual loan. It is generally difficult to purchase cover for contents only. However, 
CETZAM has been able to secure contents-only cover for its clients through a group 
policy. A fixed rate for building and contents has been negotiated with Madison 
Insurance Company and the cost of the insurance is loaded into the interest rate of the 
individual loan. The effect on the interest rate is an increase of 0.25% flat per month 
(Leftley, 2005). CETZAM submits a schedule of collateral covered under this binding 
agreement at the end of each calendar month. The sum insured is for the full value of 
the property even though CETZAM tended to use only a percentage as collateral 
(Leftley and Mapfumo, 2006).  
6.5. Microinsurance Agency 
As the first of its kind, the Micro Insurance Agency (MIA) was established as a 
specialised global microinsurance intermediary by Opportunity International (OI) (see 
Box 6.4) in 2005.  
Box 6.4: Opportunity International (OI) 
Founded in 1971 by Al Whittaker, former President of Bristol-Meyers International 
Corporation, and David Bussau, an Australian entrepreneur, as en ecumenical Christian 
development organisation, Opportunity International (OI) is today one of the leading 
international organisations in microinsurance. MFIs affiliated with OI currently offer 
insurance to 3.3 million low-income households. This includes insurance products such as 
credit life, health, disability, unemployment, crop, life and property insurance. 
There are three layers of OI: 
- Support partners: Funders 
- Implementing partners: MFIs 
- Network Service Organisation (NSO): Demand-driven consultancy, training and technical 
assistance to implementing partners in strategic planning, management information 
systems, product development and organisational development 
Up to 2000, OI focused mainly on NGOs and charities with local boards and management 
teams, and limited outreach. However, since 2000 OI has increasingly focused on MFIs with 
capacity for reaching scale as a means of increasing outreach and impact. 
The head office provides all technical and strategic leadership to the regional offices 
which operate as local relationship managers and data processing centres. MIA sells 
insurance policies through wholly owned subsidiaries. The subsidiaries are 
incorporated as local businesses and regulated as insurance agents or brokers working 
with locally regulated insurance companies, depending on the most effective legal 
structure for the country in question. 
MIA was created for numerous reasons. First, it was created to reduce the transactions 
costs per policy through scale and back office support. Reducing these costs has been 
seen as crucial to distribute policies that do not cost more than US$1-1.5 per month 
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(equivalent to £0.60-0.90). A second rationale for the creation of MIA was to extend 
microinsurance beyond active MFI borrowers by working through non-MFIs. For 
MFIs it is operationally challenging to service and issue microinsurance products not 
tied to loan disbursement and repayments. Currently MIA is offering insurance 
policies through faith-based groups and housing groups. Third, the ability to draw on 
a range of international and national risk carriers would make the provision of 
insurance possible even where local insurers would be unwilling to engage. Finally, 
MIA was created because it was believed that it could extend the range of 
microinsurance products through product innovation and R&D. Many MFIs may not 
have the capital or expertise to engage in such activities. 
To date, MIA offers a range of insurance policies through 25 MFIs based in 10 
countries, including credit life, term life, livestock, property and health insurance. One 
of the more recent innovations is a crop insurance policy. Research by OI indicated 
that local banks in developing countries were unwilling to lend to farms due to risk of 
crop failure. In response to this, MIA developed and piloted a weather-indexed crop 
insurance policy in Malawi in cooperation with the World Bank. Over 2,500 farmers 
have taken out such a policy. The policy pays out if the rainfall in the area falls under 
a certain threshold. 
6.6. Women’s World Foundation 
Since November 2003 the Colombian MFI Women’s World Foundation (WWF) (see 
Box 6.5) has been offering a voluntary group combined life and disability insurance 
policy called Amparar to its clients. 
Box 6.5: Women’s World Foundation 
The Women’s World Foundation (WWF), or La Fundación Mundial de la Mujer, was 
founded as an NGO in Bucaramanga, Colombia, in 1987. Initially concentrated in the North 
East of Colombia, today WWF has 25 agencies and 150,000 clients across most parts of the 
country. Over 70% of its clients are women, predominantly microentrepreneurs and petty 
traders. 
WWF offers a range of financial services, including group loans, microcredit, consumption 
loans and insurance. The main methodology is group lending which operates with groups of 
three to five members whereby the group guarantees individual loans. Since mid-1990s WWF 
has been offering individual loans for both consumption and business purposes. 
WWF is part of the Women’s World Banking network – a global network of 54 MFIs 
throughout Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Middle East 
Source: WWF website (www.fmmb.org), WWB website (www.swwb.org)  
WWF operates with a group policy whereby a group of clients are enrolled to a single 
contract. Generally the main advantages of such an approach is that it reduces the 
administrative and distribution costs per policyholder and it involves lower claims 
management costs as group risk profile likely closer to risk expectations than 
individual policies (Brown and Churchill, 1999). 
The policy is accessible for most clients between the ages of 18 and 70. The monthly 
premiums range from £0.60 to £3.70 and are linked to loan repayment (monthly, 
quarterly and bi-annually). This policy pays out between £790 to £5,270, depending 
on the type of policy, in the case of death of or permanent disability for policy-holder. 
The policy also pays for 12 months of groceries and utility services (£7.30-37.80 per 
month for utilities and £15-63 per month for food) and for an additional £1.20 
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monthly payments for children’s education for 24 months (£9-45 per calendar month) 
can also be included. WWF has yet to find a mechanism for making monthly 
payments so the amount is paid out in one lump sum. 
WWF works in partnership Equidad, a credit union owned insurer and the scheme 
works according to a classic partner-agency model whereby the insurer is responsible 
for product manufacturing (actuarial capacity, claims reserves, risk management, 
reinsurance, product design, claims settling) and the agent is responsible for 
marketing, sale and underwriting. The product is marketed as a WWF product with its 
own brand. WWF receives a 15% commission of each policy it sells.  
The take-up has been very high. Between November 2003 and March 2005 WWF 
sold 10,120 policies. Since November 2004 WWF has been issuing between 800 and 
1,100 policies per month. For the first 12 months, sales averaged around 480 policies 
issued per month. Over a year that translates into around 12,000 policies annually or a 
take-up of around 25%. Compared to the shareholder cooperatives of Equidad, WWF 
sells more policies relative to the number of clients. There are mainly two reasons for 
the high up-take. First, WWF links the insurance product to the loan product which 
makes it more attractive for customers. Second, loan officers receive a bonus based on 
the number of policies they sell. 
6.7. Discussion 
In the preceding sections we outlined the structures, processes and product design of 
the international microinsurance schemes in the study. However, a more important 
question is how the introduction of insurance affected the MFI (human resources, 
structures and processes) in question and its clients. Hence in this section, we discuss 
and analyse the experiences of the MFI case studies in implementing insurance that is 
affordable and has a positive impact on its clients, and that does not detrimentally 
affect the MFI’s ability to function and deliver its other products. 
6.7.1. Institutional impact: human resources, operations and systems 
In this section we explore and discuss how the case-study MFIs have managed the 
institutional implications of introducing insurance alongside their other financial 
products. We explore three areas of institutional impact: the effect of regulatory 
compliance and reporting; the impact on the operations and the management of an 
MFI; and the consequences for the organisation and use of staff. 
Most of the case study MFIs had to grapple with new reporting and regulation. For 
example, Pro Mujer Bolivia had to subject itself to regulation of the government 
regulator of pensions, investments and insurance – Superintendencia de Pensiones, 
Valores y Seguros – concerning the appropriateness of the policy and the suitability of 
the staff involved in marketing and selling insurance. 
However, in the course of the interviews, the regulatory implications were often not 
perceived as much of a burden. It should be noted that in many Developing countries, 
MFIs are already regulated as financial institutions by the Central Bank and other 
relevant agencies and authorities. As a result, they may already have developed 
procedures for collecting and reporting data, and consequently the marginal increase 
in regulation is not so keenly felt. In the case of the French MFI ADIE, complying 
with the legal requirements of insurance mediation was among the most difficult 
aspects, possibly because it had not been subject to much regulation before starting to 
offer insurance. 
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Conversely, the incorporation of insurance products alongside their other financial 
services appeared to have a greater impact on the operation and management of the 
MFIs. In part, the impact was the production of internal management reports on 
policies issues and claims. However, the most challenging aspect for most MFIs 
appeared to be managing the relationship with the insurance company. For example, 
under the partnership agreement covering its property insurance, CETZAM had to 
start submitting monthly report detailing collateral (type, value etc) covered by the 
insurance policy and to Madison. The interviewees from Pro Mujer Bolivia identified 
the management of its relationship with the insurance company was the single-
greatest challenge of providing insurance. 
Finally, the introduction of insurance policies alongside existing financial services 
also influences human resources as new staff may need to be hired and existing staff 
may have to be retrained. Especially, because insurance is a product that needs to be 
sold to a greater extent than the more intuitive and often immediately appealing micro 
credit, the relevant staff members need to be motivated and trained to sell the new 
product. This is also the case where the policy is compulsory; there is often a need to 
explain the policy to the clients and explain the benefits of it. 
The change in organisational culture towards a sales culture was cited as one of the 
greatest institutional impacts on ADIE of selling insurance policies. The ADIE 
interviewees argued that the demand for their loan products was considerable, but that 
insurance required the loan officers to sell. In order to enable the relevant staff 
members to explain and sell the relevant policies, they had to undergo a two-day 
training session and ongoing training each trimester. 
When an MFI decides to start to market and sell insurance products, the loan officers 
are most likely to see their roles and tasks altered. They are likely to be explaining, 
marketing and selling the policy. In Developing countries, they often also collect the 
loan repayments and savings, and are therefore also likely to be collecting the 
premiums. 
The loan officers at the Colombian MFI WWF could spend approximately 45 minutes 
with each client and still meet their target. As the processing of loan applications took 
around 30-35 minutes, the loan officer only had around 10-15 minutes to sell the 
policy. Therefore the MFI had to develop a simple, clear and streamlined process of 
marketing and selling. In addition, offering incentives to the loan officer proved to be 
a strong motivator driving a comparatively high take-up, as we discuss in further 
detail below. 
Pro Mujer Bolivia did not operate with a bonus system for the sale of its life and 
credit life policy, because it was compulsory. However, because the MFI operates 
with a bonus system for the number of loans issued and the portfolio quality the loan 
officers benefited, as the insurance policy made the loan more attractive and improved 
the quality of the portfolio. Initially, ADIE also experimented with staff bonuses for 
policies sold, but soon stopped bonuses as it was found to be not in the spirit of the 
MFI. 
6.7.2. Client impact: affordability and take-up of insurance policies 
In this section we discuss the extent to which and how the MFIs in the study delivered 
affordable insurance products to their clients and the take-up of these policies. In the 
MFIs where there the insurance policies were compulsory the take-up only fell short 
of 100% where the policy had yet to be rolled out to all branches. In terms of our case 
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studies, two MFIs offer insurance on a mandatory basis, two MFIs offer insurance on 
a voluntary basis and MIA offers both mandatory and voluntary policies. 
In the case of Pro Mujer, whose life insurance and credit life policies were 
compulsory, 90% of its 80,000 clients had taken up the policy. The other provider of 
mandatory insurance policies covering loan collateral and life, CETZAM, had full 
take-up. However, in one area where the MFI tested a voluntary life insurance policy, 
the take-up was 20% and it had adverse financial consequences, which we explore 
below. 
There are numerous reasons for the international tendency to offer insurance on a 
mandatory basis. First, operational limitations, such as the lack of electronic means of 
transfer and appropriate management systems, make it difficult and costly to collect 
premiums unless it is linked into loan repayments (Leftley, 2005). Second, a 
voluntary product means that considerable resources may need to be invested in 
under-writing by the insurer or the MFI driving up costs. Third, a voluntary policy 
also increases the risk of adverse selection or in other words that those most likely to 
be affected by event covered seek a policy (Leftley, 2005). This is likely to drive up 
premium costs making the product less affordable (Leftley, 2005). Finally, by 
introducing a mandatory policy, MFIs can maximise their market potential and 
increase their leverage with insurance companies.  
Turning to the providers of voluntary policies, take-up among WWF clients of its 
group life and disability policy has been relatively high. Between November 2003 and 
March 2005 WWF had sold 10,120 policies. Since November 2004 WWF has been 
issuing between 800 and 1,100 policies per month. For the first 12 months, sales 
averaged around 480 policies issued per month. Over a year that translates into around 
12,000 policies annually or a take-up of around 25%. Compared to the other 
distributors of the policies of the insurer Equidad, WWF sells more policies relative to 
the number of clients. There are mainly two reasons for the high up-take. First, WWF 
links the insurance product to the loan product which makes it more attractive for 
customers. Second, loan officers receive a bonus based on the number of policies they 
sell. 
For ADIE, the only Developed country MFI in our sample, the take-up has been lower. 
Since it started in July 2007, around 600 people have taken out vehicle, housing or 
professional multiple risk insurance, while 7-8 people have taken out the 10 year 
construction insurance policy. The relatively low up-take is in part due to the policy 
only being piloted in four regions. However, there is also likely to be greater demand 
for insurance products in Developing countries as there is a greater degree of 
vulnerability to external shocks and a less developed public safety net. For example, a 
survey of the clients of the Zambian MFI CETZAM revealed that 41% of clients 
experienced at least one death in their extended family each year and funeral costs 
averaged 3-6 months salary (Chu and Hazell, 2007). 
MIA puts great emphasis on potential to reach scale when it selects local delivery 
partner organisations and it, therefore, insures in excess of 3.3 million households.  
Affordability is another key indicator of effectiveness of a microinsurance scheme. 
This is an important aspect because financially excluded households have limited 
resources to pay for insurance and yet there may often be greater costs associated with 
delivering insurance to this segment of the population. We found that the drivers of 
affordability could be allocated to three categories. 
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The first relates to the characteristics of the insurance policy in question, namely the 
nature of the cover (compulsory vs. voluntary) and the contract (group vs. individual 
policy). The Colombian MFI WWF puts its ability to offer voluntary term life cover 
for as little as US$1 per month down to the fact that it operates with group policies, 
which drives down operating costs, and that the servicing of the loan is linked to the 
loan repayments. Similarly, CETZAM attributes the affordability of both its property 
and life insurance down to the fact that they are compulsory and that they are group 
policies. 
It is important to note that compulsory policies not only reduce the operating costs 
(e.g. acquisition costs, underwriting etc) of an MFI. They may also reduce losses and 
risks. This is well illustrated in the case of CETZAM. When the MFI launched a 
funeral benefits insurance policy in 2002, the policy was voluntary for clients in 
Livingston and compulsory in all other areas of the country. The losses where the 
policy was voluntary were considerable. In Livingstone, just over 20% took out a 
policy in the first year, but the loss ratio9 was more than 400% compared to 60% in 
areas where the policy was compulsory. This can be explained by the adverse 
selection caused by the voluntary nature of the policy (Leftley and Mapfumo, 2006). 
A second category of drivers of affordability relates to the target market, namely scale. 
For the Pro Mujer Bolivia, a large volume – the MFI has over 100,000 active 
borrowers – combined with the fact that the policy was compulsory for its borrowers 
helped drive costs down to £0.18 per month. Similarly, a key driver behind the 
creation of MIA was to achieve scale in order to deliver affordable insurance policies. 
The reason why scale is so important is due to the principle of economies of scale. 
There are certain costs that remain constant up to a certain threshold so by delivering 
a larger number of policies the costs per policy, ceteris paribus, fall. 
The third and final group of affordability drivers are related to the nature of the 
insurance provision model. As we discussed above, large volumes tend to be 
conducive to affordability, as providers can reduce the cost per policy issued. This 
lesson was embedded into the provision model of the global microinsurance 
intermediary MIA. MIA offers extensive back-office services to its local distribution 
MFI partners enabling them to deliver affordable policies to their clients and to reduce 
negative institutional impact of introducing insurance on the individual MFIs. 
In addition to the above points, it was also mentioned that an emphasis on social 
corporate responsibility may lead the insurer to subsidise the scheme, making the 
policies more affordable. In the case of ADIE, both the MFI itself and the insurance 
company did not gain any commission or profit, enabling ADIE to offer policies at a 
low cost. This was also raised at by the interviewees from Pro Mujer Bolivia, who 
argued that the low premium of £0.18 per month was a result of the insurance 
company’s commitment to social corporate responsibility and the large volume of 
policies.  
6.8. Implications for CDFI insurance delivery 
The experiences of the MFIs of developing and delivering insurance policies offer 
some important lessons to UK CDFIs. Their experiences of incorporating insurance 
products alongside their other financial services are indicative of the nature and the 
magnitude of the institutional challenges awaiting CDFI wanting to deliver insurance 
                                                 
9 Net incurred losses / net earned premiums 
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products. The experiences of the case study MFIs suggest that motivating staff and 
fitting the marketing and selling of insurance alongside their existing tasks constitutes 
a key challenge. This is especially the case for loan officers who have targets to meet. 
Based on the practices applied by the case study MFIs, potential solutions to this 
include offering bonuses and putting in place a simple and quick method for 
explaining and selling insurance. 
Furthermore, the innovative practices and methodologies used by the case study MFIs 
offer the UK CDFI sector an understanding of the drivers of take-up and affordability 
and the challenges associated with these. However, in this area there were arguably 
fewer lessons that could be immediately applied in the case of the UK CDFI sector. 
Although compulsory policies avoid adverse selection, increase up-take and reduce 
administrative costs, CDFIs are unlikely to offer such products because it would 
contradict the goal of empowering their clients to access financial products 
corresponding to their particular needs. 
Also, the findings suggest, echoing the findings concerning social housing landlord 
insurance, that the relative lack of scale may have an adverse affect on affordability. 
This is because scale, according to the principles of economies of scale, enables 
providers to reduce the cost per policy issued and pass it on to the customer. 
That said a potentially very interesting lesson for the UK sector is the finding 
concerning a centralised back-office system. According to OI and MIA, its centralised 
back-office system enables the reduction of cost per policy issued by the local 
microinsurance provider. In turn, this has led to low premiums and has softened the 
institutional impact on the local providers. A possibility for the UK CDFIs could 
potentially be to create a joint back-office system to reduce costs. 
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7. Regulatory review – Barriers and opportunities 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter looks at regulatory requirements and the potential barriers and 
opportunities for CDFIs in distributing insurance products. It is important to note that 
we here only look at the regulation of insurance mediation and not the regulation of 
insurers. In the UK insurance legislation, insurance mediation is defined as follows: 
"'Insurance mediation' means the activities of introducing, proposing or carrying 
out other work preparatory to the conclusion of contracts of insurance, or of 
concluding such contracts, or of assisting in the administration and performance 
of such contracts, in particular in the event of a claim." 
The remainder of this chapter is organised into five sections. The first section looks at 
the general requirements for being regulated as a general insurance intermediary, 
while the second examines the requirements for life insurance mediation. The third 
looks at the different roles that CDFIs could potentially take as insurance 
intermediaries and the implications of these roles. The fourth section examines 
circumstances under which CDFIs could be exempt from regulation and discusses the 
marginal growth in regulation with insurance regulation. Finally, we summarise the 
findings and identify the most important implications of regulation on UK CDFIs. 
7.2. The UK regulatory framework: general requirements 
Insurance intermediaries are regulated and supervised by the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA). 
Explaining and detailing the regulatory requirements for general insurance mediation 
is not straightforward. There are many overlapping regulatory concerns; there is 
relatively little written regulation and guidance; and ultimately the application and 
interpretation of the regulatory framework is at the discretion of the FSA. Indeed, in a 
recent report, the FSA (2007, p. 2) stated that it’s “approach will rely increasingly on 
principles and outcome-focused rules rather than detailed rules prescribing how 
outcomes must be achieved.” 
It should be noted that generally this is positive in terms of costs of the regulatory 
burden because the FSA will “where possible [discontinue] detailed, process-
orientated rules and have relied more heavily on high-level, outcome-focused 
principles and rules” (FSA, 2007, p.8). 
Specifically, the insurance mediation activities that fall under the regulatory 
framework are effecting or carrying out contracts of insurance as principal, and 
assisting in the administration and performance of a contract of insurance. However, 
ultimately so far as FSA regulation is concerned the unit of regulation is the enterprise, 
not the business area. There is no such thing under the regulations as a firm of which 
part is regulated, so if anything falls in the net then the whole firm must comply. 
If the organisation intends to be regulated at some point in the future then the risk of 
being pushed into this early has little impact. If the organisation wants to stay exempt 
for whatever reason then this risk is significant and needs to be dealt with. We discuss 
the various exemptions in Section  7.5. 
If regulated by the FSA, the activity and the insurance intermediary would have to be 
seen as complying with the four statutory objectives of the FSMA: ensuring 
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confidence in financial system; promote public understanding of financial system; 
protect customers and; reduce the probability that the organisation in question can be 
used in relation with financial crime. The businesses regulated by the FSA are 
supervised according to the risk they present to these statutory objectives. 
More specifically, the FSA assesses the extent to which the organisation complies 
with these objectives by looking at five aspects of the organisation in question: 
- Staff suitability: This includes that staff are appropriately qualified and up-to-date 
through training and in ensuring that criminal and financial soundness is 
emphasised when recruiting. 
- Adequate systems of management control 
- Financial stability 
- Appropriate business insurances: In the case of insurance mediation this would 
include indemnity insurance. 
- Appropriate mechanisms to deal with client money: Namely that client money is 
kept separate and safe (e.g. in a trustee account.) 
As a key part of being regulated, FSA authorised insurance intermediaries have to 
complete a Retail Mediation Activities Return (RAMR) with regular intervals, 
normally every six months. 
7.3. Life insurance requirements 
Life insurance is subject to a different regulatory regime because it often has an 
investment element.10 There are numerous issues that distinguish life insurance from 
general insurance and that have implications in terms of regulation. We here look at 
three issues of particular relevance. 
First, the intermediary of a life insurance policy has to assess the extent to which the 
product in question is suitable for the client. On a practical level in terms of offering 
life insurance to low-income households, there are two salient concerns. The first 
concern is that taking out a life insurance policy may not be in best interest of people 
with debt, especially for those with high-cost consumer credit. These clients may be 
better off paying off their debt. Another concern is that having a life insurance policy 
may impact upon consumers’ ability to claim means-tested benefits. In other words, 
they may be able to claim fewer benefits as a result and it may therefore not be 
worthwhile for them to have insurance.  
Second, life insurance products are classified as retail investment products and most 
of these consumers purchase as a result of an advised process11 (ORC International, 
2008). This is of importance for the access to such products for low-income 
households as research suggests that there is a threshold below which companies 
cannot profitably sell products as a result of an advised process. According to a study 
conducted for ABI and the British Bankers Association “any consumer with less than 
£110 to save monthly or £13,000 to invest as a lump sum is potentially outside the 
target market for full advice” (ORC International, 2008, p.3). 
In part in response to this exclusion, a Guided Sales process was created by the FSA’s 
Retail Distribution Review. The changes proposed under the Retail Distribution 
                                                 
10 It is important to note that funeral insurance is not seen as life insurance if the amount insured is not 
greater than the local average cost of a funeral. 
11 Advice is given to people as investors or potential investors and relates to a specific investment 
(FSA, 2008). 
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Reviews are to take effect from the end of 2012. Guided sales are defined as 
“straightforward sales processes for customers with more straightforward needs” 
(FSA, 2008, p.55). While Guided Sales were developed for both advised and non-
advised sales, consultation with industry representatives suggested that “it would be 
difficult to develop a commercially viable non-advised guided sales model” (FSA, 
2009, p. 19). ABI has produced an overview sheet outlining the Advised Guided Sales 
process, which can be found in Appendix D. 
The third and final issue concerns commission paid to the insurance intermediary by 
the insurer. Depending on the commission terms from the sale of a policy, the 
provider may want to claw back commission if the policy payments are discontinued. 
Claw-back applies to any commission paid as “indemnified commission”, i.e. paid up 
front on the basis of 2 or 4 years’ premiums being paid by the client. Commission can 
always be taken in “non-indemnified” fashion where it is paid regularly on the basis 
of actual premiums paid. This is an important issue as the claw-back of commission 
was a factor contributing to the closure of the life insurance scheme of CAP. 
7.4. Regulatory requirements for introducer, agent and broker status 
There are three potential roles for CDFIs as distributors of insurance, excluding the 
possibility of becoming an insurer. If a CDFI is exempt it can in principle take any of 
these roles without taking on regulation (see Section  7.5).  
The least involved position is one of “introducer” where the organisation connects a 
consumer with a product, from a specific insurance company but it has no other role. 
This is more like a sign-posting role, though the introducer is a form of acknowledged 
intermediary. This is probably the least regulatory rigorous approach, requiring only 
compliance with FSA sales regulation. 
The other term in use is “agent user”. An agent can be tied to one provider or it can 
operate for a panel of insurance companies. It receives a fee per policy sold from the 
insurance company in question. The key regulatory issue is holding client money. If 
client money constitutes more than 5% of turnover or more than £10,000 then the 
money either has to be held in a statutory account or £50,000 has to held in reserve.  
A “broker” offers insurance policies from a range of insurers against a commission 
from the insurance company in question. It facilitates client access to insurance 
policies and it can also potentially involve an advisory component, though this would 
need to be regulated. Being a broker may include handling claims and renewals with 
the customer. 
7.5. Exemptions from regulation 
There is a general point about whether a business envisages becoming fully regulated 
in the future. If the organisation intends to be regulated at some point in the future 
then the risk of being pushed into this early has little impact. If the organisation wants 
to stay exempt for whatever reason then this risk is significant and needs to be dealt 
with. There is no such thing under the regulations as a firm of which part is regulated, 
so if anything falls in the net then the whole firm must comply. 
The regulatory conditions are potentially onerous for a start-up situation and there are 
many exemptions available which would avoid those difficulties. But it makes a big 
difference whether the aim is to become regulated in due course or, for whatever 
reason, continue to enjoy unregulated status.  
 58 
Many third sector insurance schemes have been built around a partnership between 
existing third sector service providers and an insurance company with an interest in 
this underserved market. In this situation the insurance partner will certainly be highly 
regulated, and some of the way in which they meet that regulatory requirement will 
involve processes and procedures to be followed by their partner(s). The regulatory 
burden via a regulated partner can be significant without being directly regulated by 
the FSA. 
The only explicit exemptions from FSA regulation are for Local Authority and 
Housing Associations registered under the Housing Act 1996 or the Housing 
(Scotland) Act 2001 and are therefore incorporated in the registers maintained by the 
Tenants Services Authority or Scottish Homes. 
All other organisations seeking exemption would have to apply under PERG 5 and 
PERG 6 (perimeter guidance). The exclusions from regulation are largely contained in 
the “by way of business” test which tries to distinguish insurance intermediation 
carried out for business purposes for commercial gain from intermediation that is 
really a by-product of some other activity. For example there is an exemption 
available if the insurance part of a business is not its main line of business and 
contributes less than 10% of turnover. 
Managing claims as distinct from effecting contracts of insurance is not a regulated 
activity. The best way to deal with the question of whether or not a planned venture 
will or will not be regulated is to set up an exemplar scheme and to go through it with 
the FSA to generate an assurance that it is exempt. Future questions are then dealt 
with as departures from the model. 
If exempt the CDFIs would still have to report to the FSA with regular intervals to 
ensure that the organisation is still operating within the parameters of exemption. 
Thus a key consideration for CDFIs would be the marginal increase regulatory burden 
from being regulated as an insurance intermediary. 
Currently most of the personal lending CDFIs are registered as Industrial and 
Provident Societies (IPS). This involves very limited supervision. IPSs have to submit 
a list of approved persons and they are expected to produce annual reports. Members 
of the CDFA also have to comply with the CDFA code of conduct. 
As providers of consumer credit, the CDFIs have to have a consumer credit licence 
and be regulated under the Consumer Credit Act. This regulation mainly focuses on 
fair treatment of customers (appropriate and sufficient information, cooling period 
etc). 
Finally, as recipients DWP funding, under the Growth Fund, the CDFIs have to 
submit quarterly reports to the DWP concerning the performance of the portfolio (data 
on arrears etc) and the eligibility criteria for accessing Growth Fund loans. 
7.6. Discussion: Barriers and opportunities for CDFI participation in insurance 
provision 
The question at the heart of this research project is whether CDFIs are or have the 
potential to become feasible conduits of insurance for the financially excluded. In turn, 
the feasibility of such a scheme hinges on the compliance of this scheme with the 
relevant regulatory framework. 
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Unfortunately, it is difficult to accurately ascertain the regulatory implications for 
CDFIs if they were to become insurance intermediaries. First, the CDFIs may qualify 
for an exemption from regulation, as the social housing landlords have. However, in 
the absence of detailed parameters, it is difficult to tell whether CDFIs would qualify 
until the FSA has evaluated a specific scheme. The most likely exemption for CDFIs 
would be that insurance mediation is a by-product or at least not the main stay of their 
business. 
Second, if the CDFIs were to be regulated, the numerous overlapping regulatory 
concerns and the move towards outcome-based regulation, makes it difficult to 
ascertain the exact implications of being regulated. 
However, it would involve regular reporting to the FSA concerning financial status 
(e.g. balance sheet, profit and loss account, professional indemnity insurance etc), 
human resources (training and competence) and management systems (conduct of 
business, processes to deal with conflicts of interest) in order to prove that they 
comply with the four statutory objectives under FSMA. Although the CDFIs currently 
have some limited reporting in relation to DWP funding and have to comply with 
some relevant regulation under the Consumer Credit Act, becoming regulated under 
the FSA would most likely lead to an increase in the regulatory burden and therefore 
an additional cost for CDFIs to meet. 
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8. Conclusions: Features of CDFI insurance provision models 
In the preceding chapters of this report we have applied a litmus test on UK CDFIs in 
order to establish the conditions under which a CDFI insurance provision scheme 
could be justified and feasible. The viability and need for such a scheme would 
depend on; a) that a latent demand for insurance exists among CDFI target clients; b) 
that existing insurance schemes aimed at the financially excluded are insufficient to 
meet this latent demand; and c) that internationally tested models compliant with the 
UK regulatory framework exists. 
8.1. Is there a latent demand warranting CDFI provision of insurance? 
The findings of the focus groups organised with actual and potential CDFI clients 
suggests that there is a latent demand for, namely, life and HCI policies. However, the 
comments made by the focus group participants suggest that meeting target CDFI 
clients’ expectations of a desirable insurance policy is a tall order. Based on the focus 
group discussions, target clients want a simple and comprehensive policy covering all 
eventualities, including breakdown cover. In addition, they want the product to be 
affordable, though there appears to be a trade-off between cost and probability of the 
event in question, and many would like to at least have the option of paying in cash. 
Preferably, the sales would occur on a face-to-face basis, whereby the products and 
the fine print are well explained. Finally, target clients must be able to feel that they 
can trust that the insurer will pay out in the event of a claim and that the claims 
process is respectful and does not criminalise the claimants. 
If a CDFI insurance delivery scheme falls short of one or several of these expectations, 
the CDFI sector risks damaging its reputation and standing among existing and 
potential clients. Indeed, the focus groups revealed very negative attitudes to 
insurance policies and insurance companies, especially among those participants with 
negative experiences with insurers. If CDFIs are to distribute insurance policies, 
clients’ negative experiences with claims settlement or cancellation fees may have a 
negative impact on the reputation of CDFIs, even though it may be the fault of the 
insurance company rather than the CDFI. 
That said, the findings also indicate great opportunities for a well-designed CDFI 
insurance delivery scheme, though we would recommend not starting with HCI as we 
explain below. Face-to-face sales and accompanying light-touch advice is a key 
component of the CDFI business model. CDFI staff have built up considerable 
experience in explaining relative complex financial products to people with low 
financial capability. CDFIs already have experience in grappling with the scepticism 
of target clients towards electronic means of transfer and direct debits, and many 
CDFIs also have a positive track record of enticing clients to shift to direct debits. 
8.2. Are existing insurance schemes sufficient to meet this demand? 
The results of the focus groups were indicative of a latent demand for insurance 
policies. To what degree do the existing UK schemes meet this demand? 
Unfortunately, the lack of data makes it difficult to ascertain whether the existing 
schemes are making inroads in lowering the proportion of uninsured households. The 
estimates would indicate an average take-up of 10%.  
Yet the ABI (2007) reports that despite the fall in costs in real terms of around 40% 
from 1994 to 2007, the proportion of the population with home contents and building 
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insurance has remained relatively stable. This seems to be confirmed by data cited by 
Demos and Safe (2005). Between 1994/1995 and 2003/2004 the proportion of 
registered social landlord tenants fell from 63.4% to 59.2%, but the proportion of 
council tenants without insurance increased from 54.4% to 60.8%. The data from the 
most recent FRS suggests that the proportion of social tenants without insurance has 
remained stable at around 64%. 
The interviewees highlighted four issues that CDFIs must grapple with to make a dent 
in the number of uninsured households. First, they must overcome a deep-rooted 
distrust among low-income households of insurers. Second, many low-income 
households believe that they do not have enough assets to warrant taking out an HCI 
policy. Third, a lot of tenants mistakenly believe that they and the contents of their 
accommodation are protected against a range of incidents, such as leaking pipes. 
Finally, many elderly tenants, who have a greater propensity to take out insurance, 
have already taken out an HCI policy with Age Concern, leaving mainly the hard-to-
reach consumers. 
Also, simply relying brokering existing mainstream products is challenging as often 
end up being too costly, as OFL experienced, and as they are not adjusted to the needs 
and wishes of low-income consumers. Rather, a more sensible option would appear to 
be rolling out a generic no-frills HCI policy similar to those developed for social 
housing landlords. The affordability of such policies is a function of three factors: the 
bargaining power of social landlords as corporate clients and in view of housing stock, 
the implementation of security measures and good claims performance.  
Achieving affordable insurance products may prove to be a major challenge for 
CDFIs in that they have a much smaller target client base compared to social housing 
landlords. Another potential threat to maintaining affordability and at the same time 
ensuring that delivery costs are covered is the insistence on the part of numerous 
insurance companies on the use of insurance brokers. If both the broker and the CDFI 
charge a commission to cover delivery costs, the premiums paid by the clients may 
end up costing more. 
In terms of sustainability, the main lessons come from Age Concern and OFL. A key 
lesson is that cost transfers through effective partnerships can be vital in reaching 
sustainability. However, finding appropriate partner organisations may prove 
challenging given that social housing landlords, one of the main partner organisations 
of the CDFI sector, are already delivering their own insurance product.  
8.3. Do viable models for insurance delivery through UK CDFIs exist? 
In order to explore whether viable CDFI insurance delivery models exist to meet the 
latent demand not met by other UK schemes, we looked at a) the models applied by 
other MFIs internationally and b) on the UK regulatory framework concerning 
insurance. 
The experiences of the MFIs of developing and delivering insurance policies offer 
some important lessons to UK CDFIs. Their experiences of incorporating insurance 
products alongside their other financial services are indicative of the nature and the 
magnitude of the institutional challenges awaiting CDFI wanting to deliver insurance 
products. The experiences of the case study MFIs suggest that motivating staff and 
fitting the marketing and selling of insurance alongside their existing tasks constitutes 
a key challenge. This is especially the case for loan officers who have targets to meet. 
Based on the practices applied by the case study MFIs, potential solutions to this 
 62 
include offering bonuses and putting in place a simple and quick method for 
explaining and selling insurance. 
Furthermore, the innovative practices and methodologies used by the case study MFIs 
offer the UK CDFI sector an understanding of the drivers of take-up and affordability 
and the challenges associated with these. However, in this area there were arguably 
fewer lessons that could be immediately applied in the case of the UK CDFI sector. 
Although compulsory policies avoid adverse selection, increase up-take and reduce 
administrative costs, CDFIs are unlikely to offer such products because it would 
contradict the goal of empowering their clients to access financial products 
corresponding to their particular needs. 
Also, the findings suggest, echoing the findings concerning social housing landlord 
insurance, that the relative lack of scale may have an adverse affect on affordability. 
This is because scale, according to the principles of economies of scale, enables 
providers to reduce the cost per policy issued and pass it on to the customer. 
That said a potentially very interesting lesson for the UK sector is the finding 
concerning a centralised back-office system. According to OI and MIA, its centralised 
back-office system enables the reduction of cost per policy issued by the local 
microinsurance provider. In turn, this has led to low premiums and has softened the 
institutional impact on the local providers. A possibility for the UK CDFIs could 
potentially be to create a joint back-office system to reduce costs. 
Ultimately, the feasibility of a CDFI insurance delivery model hinges on the 
compliance of this scheme with the relevant regulatory framework. Unfortunately, it 
is difficult to accurately ascertain the regulatory implications for CDFIs if they were 
to become insurance intermediaries. First, the CDFIs may qualify for an exemption 
from regulation, as the social housing landlords have. However, in the absence of 
detailed parameters, it is difficult to tell whether CDFIs would qualify until the FSA 
has evaluated a specific scheme. Second, if the CDFIs were to be regulated, the 
numerous overlapping regulatory concerns and the move towards outcome-based 
regulation, makes it difficult to ascertain the exact implications of being regulated. 
However, it would involve regular reporting to the FSA concerning financial status 
(e.g. balance sheet, profit and loss account, professional indemnity insurance etc), 
human resources (training and competence) and management systems (conduct of 
business, processes to deal with conflicts of interest). Although CDFIs do already 
comply with some of the likely regulatory requirements and have some reporting 
mechanisms in place, FSA regulation would likely result in a considerable increase in 
reporting and compliance procedures. 
8.4. Next steps – towards a model for CDFI insurance provision 
In many ways, offering HCI would be a natural next step for CDFIs. Increasing up-
take of HCI is a key part of the government financial inclusion agenda. The IWG has 
highlighted it as the insurance policy that policy efforts should focus on. Moreover, 
many of the clients of the CDFIs are likely to be uninsured and therefore vulnerable to 
burglary, fire and floods. Also, in this study we have found that there is a latent 
demand for appropriately designed, serviced and managed HCI policies. National 
statistics suggest that the existing schemes have yet to make considerable inroads into 
reducing the proportion of uninsured households. 
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Nevertheless, having carefully considered the basis for a CDFI-model for HCI 
provision – demand, experiences of UK and international insurance schemes and 
regulatory implications – we recommend that the CDFIs do not offer HCI, at least for 
the time being. There are three reasons for this recommendation. 
First, given the strong criticism and deep-rooted scepticism of HCI policies and the 
providers these, we believe that there is a considerable reputational risk for CDFIs by 
taking on HCI. Dissatisfaction with claims handling and cancelling may well 
negatively affect the reputation of the CDFI sector and discourage new and existing 
clients from taking out loans. 
Second, the evidence from the UK and the international case study research suggest 
that scale is a key driver of affordability, due to bargaining power and economies of 
scale. Yet the number of CDFI clients is probably only in the region of 10,000. Even a 
relatively high up-take of 25% would constitute a small market. Hence it is unlikely 
that the CDFIs would be able to offer the affordable, comprehensive and simple 
policies wanted by their clients. 
Finally, although the up-take varies, there are potentially effective schemes in 
operation in the UK, such as Age Concern and Social Housing Landlord Schemes. 
Especially, the focus group participants very much liked the idea of paying insurance 
premiums with the rent. Both Age Concern and social housing landlords can rely on a 
considerable scale to ensure very competitive policies for their clients. 
Hence, rather than developing a scheme for delivering HCI, we suggest the CDFIs 
examine the possibility of delivering a joint life and credit life policy along the lines 
of the policy developed by Pro Mujer Bolivia (see Section  6.3 for further detail). Such 
a policy would offer protection for single-income households and households with 
dependents. Unlike the Bolivian MFI, we would suggest that the policy should be 
offered on a voluntary basis. The policy could be linked to the loan term, which is 
typically a year. This could appeal to customers as it is bundled with an existing 
payment and could reduce operating costs per policy issued. 
There are several reasons for why we recommend that the CDFIs distribute life 
insurance. First, it is a potentially popular product. Several of the focus group 
participants were either considering or had already taken out a life insurance policy. It 
also has historically been a policy that has sold well among low-income groups 
provided it has been distributed in a way appealing to this segment of the market. The 
best illustration of this would be the popularity of industrial branch insurance (Burton 
et al, 2007). Second, the claims handling is less controversial because it in most cases 
only require the claimants sending in the death certificate. Third, relative to HCI life 
insurance is a simpler and probably more intuitive policy. It is likely to be more 
obvious for people whether they need to consider taking one out or not (i.e. single-
income households, dependents etc). This may reduce the acquisition costs. 
However, an important consideration in offering insurance is the relative increase in 
the regulatory burden. The CDFIs may be exempt from FSA regulation on the basis, 
most likely on the basis that the insurance mediation is only a minor part of the 
business (known as the “by way of business” test). The additional burden of FSA 
regulation would have to be detailed and carefully considered. 
We suggest that an individual CDFI or a consortium of CDFIs approach an insurance 
company to develop and roll out a simple and clear life and credit life insurance, 
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possibly marketed as CDFI product. The commission should be taken on a non-
indemnified basis to avoid claw-back. 
We believe that, unlike HCI, if the policy is sufficiently affordable, it could have a 
positive reputational impact on the sector, as it is seen as helping households when at 
their most vulnerable. 
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